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The first essay provides theory concerning the risk-taking incentives of microfinance 
borrowers in varying cases: individual liability, group liability without social sanctions, 
and group liability with social sanctions. The results provide insight into how a 
community’s social capital and a country’s credit rights interact to induce recipients of 
microfinance programs to take risk. Consistent with recent anecdotal evidence that 
suggests a “dark side” to microfinance, the results show that communal ties among joint 
liability borrowing groups may not lead to higher repayment rates and may have worse 
welfare effects on the recipients by making the poorest group members unwilling to take 
the risks necessary to grow a business.  
 
The second essay considers floating rate convertibles (FRCs).  FRCs are a category of 
PIPE securities that receive negative associations in both the academic and professional 
literature.  This study sheds light on the managerial relationship to the decision to issue 
FRCs and to the variation in market response to these issues.  One main result of the 
study identifies influence of the CFO relative to the CEO as significant in the decision to 
issue FRCs and in the market’s immediate reaction to the issuance.  Another main 
result is that FRC issuing firms with CFOs without prior public equity issuance 
experience have significantly negative long run abnormal returns, whereas FRC issuing 
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Essay 1:  A Theory on the Risk-Taking Behavior of Microfinance Borrowers, Creditor Rights, 






This paper provides theory concerning the risk-taking incentives of microfinance borrowers in varying 
cases: individual liability, group liability without social sanctions, and group liability with social 
sanctions. The results provide insight into how a community’s social capital and a country’s credit rights 
interact to induce recipients of microfinance programs to take risk. Consistent with recent anecdotal 
evidence that suggests a “dark side” to microfinance, the results show that communal ties among joint 
liability borrowing groups do not lead to higher repayment rates and does have worse welfare effects on 
the recipients by making the poorest group members unwilling to take the risks necessary to grow a 
business. This paper contributes to the literature on contract design and on financial development and 




I. Introduction  
Microfinance is the popular economic development program aimed at the world’s poorest entrepreneurs 
in many developing countries. It normally consists of lending very small amounts, as little as $75, to 
invest in self-owned enterprises, in order to provide more opportunities beyond wage  labor. 
Microfinance is intriguing because it provides financial services to a very large segment of the world’s 
population, who otherwise would borrow in the informal financial market from friends, family, and 
moneylenders. Furthermore, prior to its first implementation by economics professor Mohammed Yunus 
in Bangladesh in the 1970s, very poor borrowers in developing countries were not expected to be willing 
or at least able to repay unsecured business loans made by lenders from outside their communities.  
It is commonly believed that microfinance programs succeed in leading to high repayment rates because 
of the strong social ties that exist among their clients. “Social capital” is considered an alternative to 
physical capital in the developmental economics literature. While borrowers may not have physical 
collateral to secure a loan, they do live in tight knit cultures where the social repercussions from 
defaulting on a loan could be as costly as losing material possessions. The first microfinance programs 
were thought to tap into this social capital by giving loans to groups, where each member of the group 
was liable for all the others’ share of the loan (Van Bastalaer, 2000).  
Because all members of the borrowing group are liable for each other, they have incentives to punish 
noncontributing members and to encourage each other to succeed. They also have incentives to screen 
potential members into the group as well as verify that each group member exerts effort in the projects 
so that they can repay their shares of the loans. Harnessing social capital is particularly important in 
countries where lenders have little recourse to deal with borrowers that are able to repay their loans 
but choose not to do so. This inability is often due to poor institutions like creditor rights. (La Porta, et. 
al., 1998)  
Even if borrowers own land, they may not be able to use it as collateral because of laws that restrict the 
use of land as collateral or make the ability to seize collateral very costly or impossible. Also, record of 
title may be unavailable due to poor record keeping.  
Despite the theoretical support for the value of social capital in providing financial services to 
developing nations’ poor entrepreneurs, studies of microfinance programs have also yielded some 
puzzling results. One is the success of microloans made on an individual liability basis.  
If individual liability loans have similar repayment rates as joint liability loans, what does this say 
about either the need for social capital or the necessity of the joint liability contract in harnessing it? 
The other puzzle deals with the problem of loans not being put to productive use. That is, many of 
microborrowers seem to hold onto their loans or consume them rather than invest them in a business. 
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This is one finding that does not have much theoretical explanation. Intuitively, the reasons given is 
that the members of the group receiving the loan are too afraid of the repercussions from failure from 
their peers that they prefer to use the loan to smooth their consumption and payoff the loan with 
income from pre-existing sources such as a wage earning job or even a business that they did not invest 
the loan in.  
In this paper, I develop a theoretical model on the relationship between the repayment strategies of 
microfinance borrowers and the types of projects they invest their microloans in. Besley and Coate 
(1995) model how group lending mitigates the moral hazard problem of borrowers being unable to 
credibly contract with lenders to repay their loans even when they are able. Besley and Coate address 
the question of how the lending schemes affect the incentives of borrowers to repay their loans, but they 
assume that the borrowers’ projects are exogenously given. This paper extends their model by 
endogenizing project selection under various lending schemes. By modeling the choice of what project a 
borrower will choose, I provide a theory to explain the relationship between financial contract design, a 
country’s creditor protections, investment choice, entrepreneurship, and poverty.  
I present conditions for microfinance programs resulting in optimal project selection. I show that  
certain entrepreneurs who are jointly liable for their loans will not take the necessary business risks  
that microfinance is supposed to induce them to take while not improving the repayment rate over  
individual liability. This result is driven by strong social ties that exist among borrowing group 
members, which is usually thought of as a positive effect on social welfare.  
The conclusions of this study contribute to the theory of microborrower behavior in two main ways.  The 
first theoretical contribution of this study is an extension of Besley and Coate’s (1995) comparison of the 
repayment behavior of microborrowers under varying assumptions of liability and existence of social 
sanctions.  I show that borrowers under joint liability without the threat of social sanctions are more 
likely to repay their loans than when under the threat of social sanctions.  By introducing project and 
peer selection into the model, I get this result because the threat of social sanctions stifles risk sharing 
and encourages free-riding among borrowers with low upside potential to their project options. 
The second theoretical contribution is the identification of people who choose particular types of 
contracts where there is an option between individual and joint liability contracts.  If there are no social 
sanctions, then people with high upside potential to their projects take the joint liability contract 
because the benefits of risk sharing outweigh the costs of free-riding.  People with low upside project 
potential, however, take the individual liability contracts because they do not share any risk under the 
joint liability contract by selecting safe projects.  The introduction of social sanctions to the model, 
however, effectively eliminates the use of the joint liability contract by every microborrower. 
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Ultimately, studying this question is important because microfinance institutions (MFIs), governments, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and microfinance investors want to know what model of 
microfinance to follow. Should a MFI offer joint liability contracts to borrowers who are able to sanction 
each other if one borrower does not contribute to repayment? Should a social planner subsidize MFIs 
that offer joint liability contracts or those that offer individual liability contracts?  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews the relevant literature on 
microfinance and positions this paper in the existing literature. Section three presents a model of 
individual liability lending. Section four presents a model of joint liability lending without and with 
social sanctions. Section five discusses the results of the model. Section six concludes with a summary 
and direction for further research.  
II.  Literature Review  
The literature on group lending argues for social capital to impact the likelihood of repayment through 
various channels. The most frequently cited categorization of models explaining how social capital 
impacts group repayment rates is by Ghatak and Guinnane (1999). The first is in a superior screening 
ability of peers over delegated monitors because most groups select which borrowers can join them 
(Ghatak and Guinnane 1999). The second is a superior monitoring ability of peers to control ex ante 
moral hazard (Stiglitz 1990). The third is a superior auditing ability of peers to limit verification costs. 
The fourth is a superior enforcement mechanism through imposition of social sanctions should a 
borrower default to control ex post moral hazard (Besley and Coate 1995). As opposed to comparing the 
effects of each of these four assumptions on what kind of problem social capital addresses in group 
lending, I compare the impact of various forms of social capital on risk taking and repayment of 
borrowers.  
Besley and Coate (1995) provide a model to predict how the group liability aspect of microfinance affects 
the repayment behavior of borrowers when repayment of loans is not enforceable. They compare the 
model’s predictions of repayment rates among three lending systems: individual lending, group lending 
without social sanctions, and group lending with social sanctions. The individual lending system 
describes the traditional arrangement in which the bank lends to an individual who is solely liable. The 
group lending system without social sanctions describes an arrangement in which the bank lends to a 
group of borrowers who divide the loan among themselves and invest their shares in their own 
enterprises, which are independent from one another. In this system, the group as a whole is liable, 
each member of the group decides whether or not she contributes her share to the group’s repayment, 
and the group cannot penalize noncontributing members. The group lending system with social 
sanctions describes the same arrangement, except the group can exert peer pressure on the members to 
contribute to the repayment of the loan.  
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Their main conclusions are twofold. First, the impact of group lending on repayment rates over that of 
individual lending are affected by two countervailing forces: risk-sharing and free-riding. On one hand, 
if one member of the group cannot contribute her share of the loan because of poor project returns, the 
other group members can cover her share. Therefore, group lending may improve loan repayment rates 
through sharing risk. On the other hand, a borrower who would have repaid her loan under individual 
lending might take advantage of the group’s incentives to cover her share of the loan. This free-riding 
incentive leads to a coordination failure whereby the group as a whole will default even though certain 
individuals would have repaid their own shares if they were individually liable. Without social 
sanctions, it is unclear as to which effect dominates. The second conclusion is that the free-rider effect 
can be lessened if the group is able to use social sanctions to pressure the members if they stand to lose 
a significant amount of social capital. They show that if social sanctions are great enough, then group 
lending does dominate individual lending in regard to the repayment rate.  
An extension of Besley and Coate’s model is Che (2002)’s dynamic model of repayment behavior in a 
repeated game. Che does not include social sanctions other than exclusion from participation in future 
borrowing opportunities. He shows that while the static model has ambiguous results concerning group 
lending’s repayment rates due to the free-rider problem, the dynamic model shows that group lending 
weakly dominates individual lending due to the cost of exclusion from future opportunities.  
In addition to extending their model to a dynamic setting, among the recommendations that Besley and 
Coate make for further research is to model the effect of group lending on the type of project that each 
member chooses. As this paper will show, Besley and Coate’s model can be adapted to find interesting 
implications for selection of project risk by different lending schemes. In addition, I extend their model 
to include self selection of borrowers into groups. The outcome of endogenizing project and group 
member selection is domination of the risk sharing effect without social sanctions and suboptimal risk 
taking with social sanctions.  
In addition to Besley and Coate (1995)’s focus on the enforcement problem, other theories focus on the 
problem of (i) screening out risky borrowers, (ii) monitoring borrower effort (“ex ante” moral hazard), 
and (iii) verification of project outcomes. Ghatak (1999) and Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) provide the 
most cited model of how joint liability microloans induce risky borrowers to select other risky borrowers 
to form a group and safe borrowers select other safe borrowers. By this assortive matching process, 
lenders are more able to identify risky borrowers from safe borrowers “by the company they keep”. 
Other theories such as van Tassell (1999) and Laffont and N’Guessan (2000) also conclude that 
borrowers will match with borrowers of similar riskiness. Guttman (2006, 2007), however, offers a 
model that predicts the opposite: Borrowers of opposite risk types will match with each other. Guttman 
makes this prediction because he assumes that borrowers can make side payments to each other to 
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attract group members. While both risky and safe borrowers prefer to have safe peers, the value of a 
safe peer to a risky borrower is greater than to another safe borrower.  Intuitively, this greater value 
comes from a diversification benefit of matching a risky borrower with a safe one. This later conclusion 
is also supported by my model as well as experimental evidence (Gine, Jakiela, Karlan, and Morduch, 
2010).  
Stiglitz (1990) finds group lending’s advantage in improving repayment rates come from the peer 
monitoring effect, thus limiting the ex ante moral hazard of how group members will use their loans 
and exert effort. He focuses on group members being able to observe the effort each applies to her 
projects and to write enforceable contracts among themselves.  
Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) present a model where verification of states is costly in the spirit of 
Townsend (1979), demonstrating that joint liability contracts induce truth telling by borrowers 
concerning their projects’ payoffs by delegating the auditing function to group members. Therefore, the 
lender only has to verify the state when the entire group defaults, thus reducing the number of cases 
the bank has to incur auditing costs.  
While most research deals with comparing available microfinance contracts’ impact on welfare, some 
offers new kinds of contracts that are currently not observed. Bubna and Chowdhry (2009), for example, 
offer a new institution they call, “microfinance franchising” in which a single MFI offers a lending 
franchise to local capitalists who compete with a single moneylender. Their model is currently being 
experimented in Samoa. Ayi (2007) suggests that MFIs offer a “microequity” contract whereby the MFI 
has an equity stake in the microenterprises, similar to venture capitalists.  
A similarly titled contract is also suggested by Pretes (2002). The newest stage in the microfinance 
movement is that of “microinsurance,” which offers insurance contracts to the same people that 
microloans are intended for (Morduch, 2004; McGuinness and Tounytsky, 2006; Leftley and Mapfumo).  
While all the theory on microfinance loan performance assumes that social capital is pivotal, the way in 
which social capital functions differs among the theories. The empirical research also varies in its 
conclusions regarding social capital’s effect on loan repayment and on borrower welfare.  
How aspects of borrowers’ relationship to each other and their culture add to or subtract from social 
capital is complicated. Studies on the type of social ties show that certain aspects of relationships 
among borrowers in a group differ in their effect on borrower behavior. Hermes and Lensink (2007) 
survey of empirical studies on social capital’s relationship to loan repayment identifies several 
characteristics of social capital that actually have negative effects on loan repayment: family 
membership in group, distance between members, strong social ties, group homogeneity, relatedness, 
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sharing within group, and high level of joint liability. They also find that some of these characteristics 
also have positive effects on loan repayment in other studies, indicating that the relationship between 
social capital and loan repayment is actually ambiguous. Similarly another survey concludes, “The 
results of available empirical studies are contradictory with respect to virtually all potential 
determinants of repayment performance” (Guttman, 2006).  
Studies show that the joint liability contract is not the only means of harnessing social capital. De 
Aghion and Morduch (1998) find that microfinance borrowers in transition economies who borrow on an 
individual liability basis still have incentives to repay their loans because of social stigma over default. 
Also, an individual liability loan can be marketed to, purchased by, and collected in groups, thereby 
lowering transactions costs, having a good information source, fostering education and training, and 
increasing individuals’ comfort with banks. In a randomized controlled field experiment, Karlan and 
Gine (2010) show that repayment rates of borrowers of a Philippine MFI with branches that are 
randomly converted from offering offer joint liability to loans to individual liability loans do not differ 
from unconverted branches. They find that social capital plays an important role in influencing 
repayment after branches are converted to offering individual liability loans.  
Studies on the impact of microfinance programs on repayment and on poverty reduction are not 
uniformly supportive. However, they find that the impact of microfinance programs is not uniform 
across borrowers. Hulme and Mosley (1996) and Morduch (1998) find microfinance programs are less 
effective in increasing income among those below the poverty line. In Hulme and Mosley (1996), the 
researchers suggest that microfinance programs’ impact decreases with falling income because the 
borrowers below the poverty line take less risks, invest less in technology, and use their loans to protect 
their subsistence. In some cases, the loans lower income among the poorest of the poor (Khawari 2004). 
Many microfinance borrowers take loans to reduce variation in consumption and not to increase 
expected income.  
Pretes (2002) criticizes the use of microfinance for certain borrowers. He cites cases where very poor 
borrowers become worse-off because of business failure. They attempt to repay their portion of the loan 
by borrowing from moneylenders, selling their household assets or food, or leaving their home to find 
wage labor. Taking these drastic steps as opposed to just defaulting as would be the case in a country 
with developed bankruptcy laws may be due to “the darker side of collective peer pressure.” Social 
sanctions may be so strong that the borrower may be in fear of becoming an outcast. Also, since most 
microfinance borrowers are women in countries where they are under a high degree of male control, the 
husbands of the borrowers sometimes take the money away, leaving the wife to struggle to find a way to 
repay the loan. So, the informal institutions of the community and the home may not allow for 
microfinance to succeed in empowering borrowers to take the appropriate risks as an entrepreneur. 
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Pretes postulates that the high repayment rates of microfinance programs are misleading as to their 
effectiveness in reaching the very poor, as “financial benefits disproportionately accrue to the middle 
poor and do not reach the very poor.”  
This paper contributes to the literature on microfinance by combining Besley and Coate’s model with 
other models of microfinance to consider how the group lending system affects peer and project choices. 
Allowing for projects of varying levels of risk is an important assumption due to the empirical evidence 
that project selection matters. The model’s results provide a theoretical explanation for the finding that 
group lending can have the opposite effect on investment decisions than is intended. I show how the 
nature of social sanctions that are levied by the group play a role in this result.  
III. Individual Lending  
Consider an entrepreneur’s payoff function when liability is individual. In the first period, t = 0, the 
borrower receives a loan of l at an interest rate, i. At t = 1, the borrower chooses whether to invest in a 
safe or risky project. At t = 2, the investment returns are realized and the borrower chooses whether to 
repay the loan. Assume that without a loan, the entrepreneur would not be able to invest in any project. 
All loans are for the same amount and require a repayment of r. r = l(1+i). The project returns a random 
variable,θ~ . If the risky project is taken, then the outcome has either a high or low payoff (θL or θH) with 
equal probability. If the safe project is taken, then the outcome has a payoff of θS with probability of 1. 
θS = (θL + θH)/2. After the payoffs are realized, the entrepreneur has the choice of repaying or not 
repaying the loan. Partial repayment is not a possibility.  If she repays the loan, she has a net payoff of 
θ~  - r.  
The assumption of either full repayment or total default is made by Besley and Coate (1995).  It is a 
realistic assumption because these are very small loans, where the amount to be voluntarily paid can be 
thought of as discrete.  Alternatively, the consequence to defaulting can be thought of as discrete, where 
any kind of default disqualifies the borrower from borrowing in the future.  Therefore, she would not 
have any motivation to make a partial repayment.  Also, the model can be adapted to there being 
partial repayment in that the borrower faces a potential penalty for strategically defaulting.  The 
penalty may include collection of a portion of her project’s payoffs when she defaults.  
If she does not repay the loan, then she incurs costs of various forms. First, the lender may penalize her 
for defaulting through refusing to make future loans or sharing this information with other 
potential lenders (a credit bureau). Second, the lender may retrieve a portion of what is owed by 
litigation. Third, the borrower may face loss of reputation in her community. Fourth, the borrower  
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may expend resources to hide her profits from the lender and her community.  Fifth, the borrower 
may inflict guilt on herself for not repaying the loan when she has the means to repay it.   
 
Because I am considering lending in a developing country where institutions that allow for contract 
enforcement are lacking, the bank is limited in how much it can penalize the borrower.  The costs of 
default may differ from those in a developed country.  First, the loan officer may not be able to 
credibly commit to refusing to make another loan and there may not be a credit bureau if there are 
other lenders in the market.  Second, bringing the case to court may be too costly to the lender for 
the amount that would be recovered, and the laws governing collection of debts in developing 
countries often favor the debtors over the creditors.  Third, though the borrower is individually 
liable, she may be concerned with what her community thinks of her if she does not repay a debt.  
Because the borrowers under consideration typically live in tight knit communities, the knowledge 
and opinions of others concerning one’s own affairs could be quite significant.  On the other hand, 
her community may have greater solidarity with her rather than the bank, thereby causing it to be 
understanding of a defaulting borrower’s non-repayment.  Fourth, the borrower may very easily hide 
the amount of her project’s payoffs from observation if she lives in a remote village.  Fifth, whether 
borrowers’ average conscience in developing countries differs from other borrowers is unknown. 
 
Assume that the penalty for default is increasing in her project’s payoffs.  Assume there is a fixed 
cost and a variable cost that is increasing in project payoffs.  For simplicity, I assume that penalty 
function is an affine function in project payoffs.  Let αf represent the fixed cost and α ∈ (0,1) 
represent the variable cost per unit of project payoff.  The penalty function is defined as p(θ~ )=αf + 
αθ~ .  Assume for now that αf =0 so that all of the penalty is linear in project payoffs.  Making this 
assumption will not change the analysis as long as αf is not greater than r.  I assume that penalties 
increase in project payoffs for the following reasons.  First, limitation on obtaining future financing 
limits the ability of the successful but defaulting entrepreneur from being able to fully utilize her 
present project’s payoffs.  That is, a portion of the value of project payoffs may be in the ability to 
invest them in future projects.  If additional external financing is also necessary for this future 
investment and there are increasing returns to scale, then the value of these payoffs will be less.  
Second, the greater the payoff, the greater is the amount that may be retrieved through litigation.  
Third, the community would probably think worse of a defaulting borrower the more able she is of 
repayment.  Fourth, the more project payoffs there are, the more there is to hide; the more there is to 
hide, the more costly it is to hide.  Fifth, the defaulting borrower would probably think worse of 
herself the more she is able to repay.   
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The entrepreneur will repay only when the payoff from doing so is greater than not doing so, which 
is when θ~  ≥ r/α.  See Proof 1. 
 
Therefore, the individual’s payoff function is )~)1(,~max()~(* θαθθ −−= rP  from implementing the 
optimal strategy.  Figure 1 graphs the individual lending optimal strategy payoff function.   
 
 
Note that this payoff function is weakly convex in θ~ : 
 
Proposition 1:  An individual liability borrower’s optimal repayment strategy (s*) 
implies the utility (UI) of the individual liability loan to be convex in her project’s 
payoffs (θ~ ).  See Appendix for proof. 
 
As can be seen in Figure 1, if the entrepreneur were to select between the safe and risky projects, 
then she would certainly choose the risky project if θ H > r/α > θ L: 
 
Proposition 2:  An individual liability borrower’s optimal investment decision (p*) is 
to take the risky project (R) rather than the safe project (S).  See Appendix for proof. 
   
r/α θ~  
P(θ~ ) 
Figure 1.  Individual borrower’s net payoff as a function of her project’s payoffs 
(θ~ ), assuming penalty parameter (α) and amount owed (r). 
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However, if θ S ≥ r/α, then the lender would prefer that the safe project be chosen, in which case its 
expected repayment would be r, rather than the risky project, whose expected repayment is r/2: 
 
Proposition 3:  The expected repayment rate of an individual liability loan is 50 
percent.  See Appendix for proof. 
 
Typically, in developed countries’ markets for loans where there are significant information 
asymmetries, credit rationing is understood to occur due to the moral hazard at the investment 
choice stage induced by setting interest rates high enough to compensate for the prior riskiness of 
the borrower (Stiglitz and Weis 1981).  Because this agent’s action in this moral hazard problem 
occurs before the project payoffs are realized, this type of moral hazard is referred to as ex ante moral 
hazard.  This is demonstrated in Proof 2, where the borrower would choose to invest in the risky 
project that has only a 50 percent chance of her repaying the loan instead of the safe project, which 
the bank would prefer her to take.  The bank is limited in raising r to compensate for this problem 
because the critical point, r/α, for the borrower to choose to repay the loan increases in r.  However, if 
α is higher, then the expectation of repayment is higher because the critical point for the repayment 
decision, r/α, is lower and the fraction of payoffs recoverable in default is higher.  Therefore, the bank 
will limit its losses through controlling the quantity of credit supplied rather than in price. 
 
In undeveloped economies with weak institutions, another type of moral hazard is introduced: 
whether or not to default when the borrower is in fact capable of repaying the loan (Besley and Coate 
1995). This other type of moral hazard is referred to as either ex post moral hazard, strategic default, 
or unenforceability.  If α is higher, then the expectation of repayment is higher because the critical 
point for the repayment decision, r/α, is lower and the fraction of payoffs recoverable in default is 
higher.  This can be seen in the proof for Proposition 1. 
 
IV.  Joint Liability Lending 
Next, consider an entrepreneur’s payoff function when the loan is made to a group.  I model group 
lending in a two-player (like Besley and Coate), three-period (t = {0,1,2}) game in which both 
borrowers choose whether or not to contribute to the repayment of their loan.  The two borrowers are 
identified as “Borrower j” where j = 1 or 2.  In the first period, t = 0, the two-member group forms 
and receives a loan.  The loan agreement stipulates that the group must pay a total of 2r in principal 
and interest in the last period, t = 2.  (Under individual lending, each borrower would have to pay r.)  
At t = 1, each borrower invests her share of the loan in a project that yields a random variable, jθ
~
.  
She chooses between two investments, safe or risky.   
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At t = 2, each group member decides whether or not to contribute to the repayment of the loan.  
Following the assumption of Besley and Coate (1995), the group as a whole can either default on the 
entire loan or repay the entire amount.  If each member does contribute, then borrower j has a payoff 
of jθ
~
-r.  If one contributes nothing, then the other borrower can either decide to also contribute 
nothing, thereby allowing the group to default, or to cover both members’ share and repay the entire 
loan.  If the group defaults, then, the borrowers are penalized by the same amount as under 
individual liability (p( jθ
~
)).  The penalties are increasing in jθ
~
.  Therefore, if the group defaults, then 
each member gets a payoff of jθ
~
 (1-α).   
 
IV. A.  Joint Liability Lending without Social Sanctions 
It has already been recognized that simply making borrowers jointly liable for each other’s loan does 
not have strictly positive net effects on borrower repayment (Besley and Coate 1995).  Furthermore, 
it has been shown empirically in the Philippines that joint liability is not the only method by which 
social capital can impact the probability of repayment by groups (Karlan, et. al.).  Therefore, the first 
kind of group lending that I consider is one where the group members are jointly liable for each other 
but cannot impose any kind of penalty for non-contribution to the repayment of the loan.  I call this 
type of harnessing of social capital as joint liability lending without social sanctions.  By making this 
distinction, I can separate out the effects of joint liability itself from other factors on the enforcement 
mechanism. 
 
Optimal Strategies at t=2 
The two group members have to choose a strategy of either contribute (C) or not contribute (NC).  
Let sj ∈ {C,NC} denote the strategy played by borrower j.  Each borrower’s net payoff depends on the 
strategy played by the peer.  Denote borrower 1’s net payoff as )]~,~(),,[()~,( 2121
11 θθθ ssUsU JJ ≡ .  
Their payoffs from each possible strategy are denoted in Figure 2. 
 
  Borrower 2 Strategy (s2) 
  C NC 
C r−1
~θ , r−2θ  r2
~
1 −θ , 2




~θ , r2~2 −θ  )1(
~
1 αθ − , )1(
~
2 αθ −  
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Figure 2.  Joint liability without social sanctions net payoffs 
)~,(1 θsU J , )~,(2 θsU J under the four possible strategy combinations 
of both borrowers in a group. 
 
Project returns, 1
~θ  and 2
~θ , determine the payoffs of each combination of strategies.  Therefore, the 
Nash equilibria vary by the realizations of 1
~θ  and 2
~θ .  The optimal strategies, then, proven in 







~θ  < r/α r/α ≤ 2
~θ  < 2r/α 2
~θ  ≥ 2r/α 
1
~θ  < r/α (NC, NC) (NC, NC) (NC, C) 
r/α ≤ 1
~θ  < 2r/α (NC, NC) (C, C) (NC, C) 1
~θ  
1
~θ  ≥ 2r/α (C, NC) (C, NC) (C, NC), (NC, C) 
Figure 3.  Nash equilibrium strategies (s1*, s2*) for various project under joint liability without 
social sanctions. 
 
The impact of joint liability without any social sanctions on bank repayment appears ambiguous.  On 
one hand, there is a positive effect of joint liability on borrower repayment.  Suppose the bank makes 
two loans on an individual liability basis to the two members in this group.  If one’s project payoffs 
were less than r/α but the other’s were greater than 2r/α, then only one loan would have been repaid.  
However, under joint liability, the borrower with the project with the higher payoffs will pay for her 
peer’s loan.  The bank then has both loan repaid under joint liability.  This positive effect on the 
probability of repayment of loans is the risk-sharing effect.   
 
Consider now a different scenario:  Borrower 1 has payoffs greater than r/α but less than 2r/α, and 
Borrower 2 has payoffs less than r/α.  Under individual liability one loan is repaid.  Under joint 
liability, neither loan is repaid because Borrower 1 will not cover for Borrower 2.  This negative 
effect on the probability of repayment of loans is the free-riding effect. 
 
A borrower’s expected payoff function under optimal strategies, then is more complicated than under 
individual liability because her net payoffs and optimal strategies depend on the payoffs of the other 
borrower’s project and her strategy.  The dominance of the risk sharing effect or the free riding effect 
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depends on the project payoff.  If her peer contributes to the repayment of the loan, Borrower 1, in 
contrast to the individual liability case, keeps more of her project’s payoffs in low payoff states ( 1
~θ  < 
r/α) due to the risk-sharing effect, has the same net payoff in intermediate payoffs (r/α ≤ 1
~θ  < 2r/α), 
and keeps all of her project’s payoffs in high payoffs ( 1
~θ  ≥ 2r/α) due to the free-riding effect.  
However, if her peer does not contribute to the repayment of the loan, Borrower 1 keeps the same 
amount of the loan for low payoffs (θ1 < r/α), has lower net payoffs under intermediate payoffs (r/α ≤ 
1
~θ  < 2r/α) due to the coordination failure induced by free-riding, and also has lower net payoffs 




Figure 4.  Optimal strategy net payoff functions of Borrower 1.  The solid lines 
represent P*1(θ1|C), the optimal strategy net payoff if Borrower 2 contributes 
to repayment.  The dashed line represents P*1(θ1|NC), the optimal strategy net 
payoff if Borrower 2 does not contribute to repayment. 
 
The uncertainty surrounding what a borrower’s payoffs does not only stem from the payoffs of her 
peer’s project, but also on which equilibrium strategy they play.   When both projects have high 
levels of payoffs, they play either (C, NC) or (NC, C).  This surprising result that one borrower allows 
the other to free-ride on her comes from neither borrower credibly being able to commit to the group 
to default  This leaves a question of which equilibrium strategy will be played when project payoffs 












s2 = NC 
s2 = C 
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it, then the Pareto improving strategy may be played more often.  For the purposes of a borrower’s 
prior beliefs about which equilibrium strategy will be played, I will assume that the probability of 0.5 
for each strategy when there are two equilibrium strategies.3 
 
Optimal Strategies at t=1 
Each borrower will uses her expectations of her own project’s payoffs and her peers at t=1 when she 
chooses what kind of project in which to invest.  Assume that there are two projects to choose from, 
as under the individual liability case.  For simplicity, add the assumption that the safe investment’s 
payoffs are strictly less than 2r/α.  Does Borrower 1 choose the risky or the safe investment if 
Borrower 2 invests in the safe investment?  What does Borrower 1 choose if Borrower 2 invests in 
the risky investment.   
 
To address the first question, assume that Borrower 2 invests in the safe investment.  This means 
that Borrower 2’s project yields θ S, where 2r/α > θ S ≥ r/α.  If Borrower 1 invests in the safe project, 
then her project’s payoff is in the same range, and they would play (C, C).  Borrower 1’s expected net 
payoff, then, is θ S– r.  If Borrower 1 were to invest in the risky project, then the group will default if 
her project pays θL, or it will repay the loan with her paying all of it if her project pays θH.  Her 
expected payoff is θ S - α θL/2 – r, which is less than θ S– r, the net payoff from taking the safe project.  
She, therefore, prefers to take the safe project: 
 
Proposition 4:  Under a joint liability contract, if one borrower invests in the safe 
project, then the other borrower will also invest in the safe project (S) rather than the 
risky project (R).  See Appendix for the proof. 
  
Next, consider what Borrower 1’s net payoffs would be under the two investment options if Borrower 
2 takes the risky project.  There are now five possible net payoffs if she takes the risky project shown 
in Figure 5. 
                                                 
3 One possible rule of the game is for each borrower to flip a coin when they come 
together at t=2 to determine who plays her strategy first.  If both have payoffs greater 
than 2r/, then the loser of the coin flip goes second and therefore covers the entire 
loan. 
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Figure 5.  Optimal strategy net payoffs to Borrower 1 when both borrowers take the risky project. 
 
 
The expected payoff for Borrower 1 in taking the risky project when Borrower 2 does 
the same is θS - α θL/4  - 3r/4.  If Borrower 1 takes the safe project when Borrower 2 
takes the risky, then Borrower 1 has possible payoffs shown in Figure 6 instead.  Her 
expected net payoff from taking the risky project would be θS - α θL/2.   
 
 
Figure 6.  Optimal strategy net payoffs to Borrower 1 when Borrower 2 takes 
























L (NC, NC) θ1
L(1 - α)     0.25 
(NC, C) θ1
L       0.25 
(C, NC) θ1
H – 2r     0.25 
(C, NC) θ1
H – 2r     0.125
  
(NC, C) θ1




~θ  Possibilities    NE Strategies      P1*( 1










L (NC, NC) θ1
S(1-α) 0.5 
(NC, C)  θ1
S  0.5 
1
~θ , 2
~θ  Possibilities 
 
  NE Strategies      P1*( 1





   
Her payoff from choosing the safe project over the risky project is θS - α θS/2 – [θS - αθL/4  - 3r/4] = 
3r/4 - αθL/4.  Comparison of the expected utilities yields the following result: 
 
Proposition 5:  Under a joint liability contract, if one borrower invests in the risky project, then the 
other borrower will invest in the risky project only if her projects’ high state payoff is greater than 
α
r3
.  Otherwise, she will invest in the safe project.  See Appendix for the proof. 
 
Each borrower, therefore, knows that if she takes the safe project, then the other borrower will take 
the safe project, also.  If she takes the risky project, then the other borrower will take the safe project 
only if θH  ≤ 3r/α and will take the risky project only if θH > 3r/α.  The borrowers investing in different 
projects, however, is not an equilibrium strategy because if Borrower 2 first chooses a risky 
investment and Borrower 1 responds by choosing a safe investment because θH  ≤ 3r/α, then Borrower 
2 would reverse her investment decision to the safe investment as shown in Proof 4.  Therefore, if θH 
≤ 3r/α, then both borrowers choose to make the safe investments; and if θH > 3r/α, then both 
borrowers choose to make the risky investments.  In other words, if the mean payoffs of the 
investments are higher, then the borrowers will choose risky strategies. 
 
Optimal strategies at t=0 
If the payoffs of the possible projects differ between the group members, then borrowers with θH  ≤ 
3r/α, who always prefer the safe project select other borrowers who would prefer the safe project, too.  
Likewise, the borrowers with θH  > 3r/α select other borrowers with the same possible high payoff 
state.  Therefore, when there are no social sanctions on noncontributing group members, there is 
assortive matching of borrowers, consistent with Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) and Ghatak (1999): 
Corollary 1:  Borrowers with high possible project payoffs (
a
rH 3>θ ) select each 
other to take joint liability loans and invest in risky projects.  Other borrowers 
(
a
rH 3<θ ) select each other and invest in safe projects.  See Appendix for the proof. 
 
Optimal group project selection under joint liability without social sanctions is peer dependent.  That 
is, even if the project opportunity sets between the two borrowers differ, each borrower’s strategy is 
dependent on whether at least one borrower always prefers to take the safe investment.   
 
Does the lender choose to make this joint liability loan rather than two individual liability loans?  If 
θH  ≤ 3r/α, then both borrowers play “safe”, which implies a repayment probability of 1.  If θH > 3r/α, 
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then both borrowers play risky, which implies a repayment rate of (2r * 0.75 + 0 * 0.25)/(2r) = 0.75.  
These repayment rates are improvements over the repayment rate of making two individually liable 
loans:  (2r * 0.25 + r * 0.5 + 0 * 0.25)/2r = 0.5 because the individually liable borrower will always 
choose the risky investment.  Since the lender has a higher probability of being repaid under joint 
liability, borrowers benefit from reduced credit rationing and reduced interest rates.  This is shown 
formally in the proof for the following proposition in the Appendix: 
 
Proposition 6:  The expected repayment rate of a joint liability loan is between 75 
and 100 percent. 
 
Presuming the same availability and terms of credit, does the borrower choose to accept a joint 
liability loan over an individual liability loan?  If θH ≤ 3r/α, then Borrower 1 has an expected payoff of 
θS – r if she has a joint liability loan because both take the safe projects.  This is less than the 
expected payoff from taking an individual liability loan.  See Proof 2.  If θH > 3r/α, then Borrower 1 
will have an expected payoff of θS – αθL/4  – 3r/4.  This net expected payoff is also less than that 
under individual liability.  The difference in net expected payoffs of the individual liability loan over 
the joint liability loan is [θS – αθL/2  – r/2] – [θS – αθL/4  – 3r/4] = (r - αθL)/4  > 0 since θL < r/α.  
Therefore, if equal in terms and accessibility, microentrepreneurs would prefer the individual 
liability loan.  See Proposition 12 in the Appendix with proof. 
 
The insight that the joint liability contract without social sanctions induces the borrowers to take 
safe investments when the payoff possibilities are lower implies that the risk sharing effect does 
dominate the free riding effect.  This result contradicts Besley and Coate (1995), who argue that the 
ability of borrowers to level punishments on one another is a necessary element to guarantee 
superior repayment rates for joint liability loans.  I find this different result because I relax their 
assumption of project choice being exogenous. 
 
IV. B.  Joint Lending with Social Sanctions 
Now, I allow group members to penalize each other if one does not contribute to the repayment of the 
loan.  Following Besley and Coate (1995), social sanctions are a function of payoffs of the 
noncontributing borrower, and not on observation of effort or project selection.  Social sanctions can 
be in the form of loss of reputation in the community or inability to participate in future loans.  
“Social sanctions” can also be seen as the group member’s internal sense of obligation or guilt or for 
not contributing to the repayment of the loan even if the community completely forgives her.  With 
an outside, impersonal institution, she may not have such guilt for defaulting.  Social sanctions’ 
sensitivity to realized returns are assumed to be more punitive than the bank penalty functions; this 
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belief is the basis for arguments that the cultural realities of these borrowers can induce them to 
repay their loans better than what a lender outside the community has at its disposal.  The structure 
of the social sanctions function, s(θj), is similar to that of the bank penalty function:  
jfj ss θβ
αθ ~)~( += , where sf ≥ af and W ≤ β ≤ 1.  1/β represents the increased degree by which the 
contributing borrower can penalize the noncontributing borrower over that of the bank.  A larger β 
implies relatively greater leniency by the group. 
   
Optimal Strategies at t=2 
A group member’s payoffs decrease by )~( js θ  only when the other group member repays the loan and 
the member being sanctioned does not contribute.  If the loan is not repaid (i.e., neither borrower 
contributes), then they do not sanction each other, but they are both penalized by the bank.  
Continue to assume that af = 0, and also assume for now that sf = 0.  The borrowers’ payoffs to each 
pair strategies are given in Figure 7. 
 
 Borrower 2 Strategy (s2) 










~θ  (1-α/β), 2
~θ -2r 1
~θ  (1-α), 2
~θ (1-α) 
Figure 7.  Joint liability with social sanctions net payoffs ( )~,(1 θsU JS , 
P2( 2
~θ |s1)) under the four possible strategy combinations of both 
borrowers in a group. 
 
Project returns, 1
~θ  and 2
~θ , determine the payoffs of each combination of strategies as in the 
previous considered case.  Therefore, the Nash equilibria vary by the realizations of 1
~θ  and 2
~θ .  The 
optimal strategies are in Lemmas 3.1 – 3.4 in the Appendix with proofs and summarized in a table in 
Figure 8.  The optimal strategies when borrowers can sanction each other are less likely to be 
dominated by free-riding.  When both borrowers have payoffs in excess of βr/α, then the entire group 
repays the loan.  Furthermore, since β ≤ 1, the lender is more likely to be repaid than in the 
individual liability case, where the critical point for individual repayment is r/α ≥ βr/α.  However, 
joint liability with social sanctions still suffers from the problem of a borrower with medium level 
payoffs not contributing her portion when her peer’s project has very low payoffs. 
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~θ  < βr/α βr/α ≤ 2
~θ  < 2r/α 2
~θ  ≥ 2r/α 
1
~θ  < βr/α (NC, NC) (NC, NC) (NC, C) 
βr/α ≤ 1
~θ  < 2r/α (NC, NC) (C, C) (C, C) 1
~θ  
1
~θ ≥ 2r/α (C, NC) (C, C) (C, C) 
Figure 8.  Nash equilibrium strategies (s1*, s2*) for various project payoffs under joint liability with 
social sanctions. 
 
Figure 9 graphs the payoffs of these optimal strategies.  The new payoff functions with social 
sanctions differ from those without.  The joint liability loan without social sanctions does have 
payoffs that exceed that of the social sanctions case and the individual liability case due to the 
reduction in the free-riding effect.  Borrowers are more likely to both contribute to the repayment of 
the loan for high realizations of project payoffs.  However, there are no net payoffs under joint 
liability with social sanctions that exceed that of the individual liability case.   
 
Figure 9.  Optimal strategy net payoff functions of Borrower 1 under joint 
liability with social sanctions.  The solid line represents P*1( 1
~θ |C), the optimal 
strategy net payoff if Borrower 2 contributes to repayment.  The dashed line 
represents P*1( 1
~θ |NC), the optimal strategy net payoff if Borrower 2 does not 








s2 = NC 
s2 = C 
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Optimal Strategies at t=1 
As in the other joint liability case, each borrower will use her expectations of her own project’s 
payoffs and her peers’ at t =1 when choosing what kind of project in which to invest.  Assume that 
there are two projects to choose from as before and that that the safe investment’s payoffs are 
strictly less than 2r/α.  Does Borrower 1 choose the risky or the safe investment if Borrower 2 
invests in the safe investment?  What does Borrower 1 choose if Borrower 2 invests in the risky 
investment?  
 
First, consider what possible net payoffs Borrower 1 faces if Borrower 2 chooses the safe investment.  
If Borrower 1 chooses the safe investment also, then they would play (C, C), and Borrower 1 has a 
net payoff of θS – r for sure.  If Borrower 1 chooses the risky investment, then she has a net payoff of  
θH – r if the project pays θH, and she has a net payoff of either θL – r or θL(1-α/β), depending on 
whether θL is greater than or less than βr/α, respectively.  If θL ≥ βr/α, then her expected net payoff is 
(θH – r)/2 + (θL – r)/2 = θS – r, making her indifferent between taking the safe project and the risky 
project.  In either case, both she and her peer contribute to repayment.  If θL < βr/α, then her 
expected net payoff is (θH – r)/2 + θL(1-α/β)/2 = θS - α θL/(2β) – r/2.  In this case, she will choose the 
risky investment: 
 
Proposition 7:  If borrower 2 invests in the safe project, then borrower 1 will invest 
in the risky project.  See Appendix for the proof. 
 
Next, consider what possible net payoffs Borrower 1 faces if Borrower 2 chooses the risky 
investment.  If Borrower 1 also chooses the risky investment, she faces four possible net payoffs.   
Figure 10 shows the net payoffs for that case.  In this case, there are possibilities that Borrower 1 
will either depend on her peer to cover her portion of the loan or she will cover her peer’s portion of 
the loan.  The expected net payoff from taking the risky investment when Borrower 2 also takes the 















θ .  If Borrower 1 takes the safe project, however, then 
she has possible net payoffs shown in Figure 11.  The expected net payoff from taking the safe 








+−= αθθ . 
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The difference in taking the risky project over taking the safe project when Borrower 2 takes the 
























rS +≥ and the safe project otherwise: 
 
Proposition 8:  If 
α
βθ rL <1 and borrower 2 invests in the risky project, then 






rS +≥ .  Otherwise, borrower 1 
will take the safe project.  See Appendix for the proof. 
 
 
Figure 10.  Optimal strategy net payoffs to Borrower 1 when both borrowers take the risky 
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Figure 11.  Optimal strategy net payoffs to Borrower 1 when Borrower 2 takes the risky 
project, Borrower 1 takes the safe project, there are social sanctions, and θL ≤ βr/α. 
 
 
Optimal Strategies at t=0 
The following lemmas identify which peers each type of borrower prefers according to her expected 
project payoff: 
 
Lemma 4.1:  For the borrower who will always choose the risky project, i.e. those 





, it is preferable for her to 
find a peer who will choose the safe project.  See Appendix for the proof. 
 
 
Lemma 4.2:  For the borrower who will invest in the safe project when her peer 
invests in the risky project, it is preferable for her to find a peer with low expected 








.  See Appendix for the proof. 
 
By consequence of these preferences, borrowers with similar project expected payoffs will match 
together, as stated in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 9:  Borrowers will match with other borrowers with the same expected 
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Proposition 10:  The only investment strategies that will be played are P1=P2=R for 
groups with high expected project payoffs and P1≠P2    for groups with low 
expected project payoffs.  See Appendix for the proof. 
 
 
Would we see groups who play opposite investment strategies?  Guttman (2006, 2007) show that if 
group members can select each other and they can make side payments to each other, then the 
risky borrowers will match with safe borrowers.  My model is consistent with this finding because 
groups of borrowers with low expected payoffs play opposite investment strategies.  However, my 
model does not identify which borrower would invest in which type of project, though the 
possibility of side payments could resolve such a question as long as each borrower has an equal 
probability of offering the side payment and receiving it. 
 
In the above scenario, the repayment rate is 0.5: 
 
Proposition  11:   The expected repayment  rate of a joint liability loan with  the 
possibility of social sanctions is between 50 percent and 75 percent.  See Appendix for 
the proof. 
 
Therefore,  the  repayment rate of joint liability contracts with social sanctions is greater than that of 
the individual liability contract.  However, if all borrowers have average project prospects that are 
sufficiently low, then the repayment rate is no greater than the individual liability’s.  See the proof for 
Proposition 11.  Therefore, we see a case where a joint liability contract might be inferior to an 
individual liability contract because both the lender will not be any better off, and the borrower will 
be worse off. 
 
Note that the conditions for the mixed investment strategy of borrowers, for whom θ1S ≤ (2 + β)r/(2α), 
implies that the more stringent the social sanctions (lower β), the less likely it is that the mixed 
investment strategy will occur because the minimum threshold for taking the (Risky, Risky) strategy 
is lowered.  Therefore, though joint liability with social sanctions leads to lower repayment rates 
than a joint liability without them, stronger social sanctions do make it less likely that the 




V.  Welfare Comparisons and General Equilibrium Extension 
 
The ultimate question for microfinance institutions, governments, and NGOs is what type of contract 
maximizes welfare?  The microfinance contract that maximizes societal welfare is one that increases 
the expected net payoff to one borrower without decreasing the expected repayment to the lender.4
 
 
Recent  experience  with  individual  liability  contracts  supports  my  contention  below  that   the 
individual liability contract is often superior to the joint liability contract.   It has been  found in 
practice  as  well  as  in  controlled  experiments  that  MFIs  that  switched  from  joint  liability  to 
individual liability loans did not experience a decrease in loan repayments. 
 
Social capital, therefore, has a ”dark side” of inhibiting some borrowers from taking more risk, which 
does not improve repayment rates because of the enforceability problem that exists in the countries 
these loans are made in.  These results provide some counter predictions to the  usual beliefs that 
group lending programs improve repayment rates because the group is able to penalize its members 
by  taking  away  some  of  their  social  capital. Furthermore,  these  results  give  a  theoretical 
explanation for anecdotal evidence of the negative welfare effects of microfinance programs on very 
poor borrowers  (Khawari 2004, Hulme and Mosley 1996, and  Pretes 2002).   These borrowers  in 
particular seem to pick relatively overly safe projects.  The empirical evidence shows it is the very 
poor for whom microfinance does not work as well as  intended.   The results presented here show 
group lending produces the same choice by  borrowers  facing project opportunity sets with a low 
expected outcome.  If borrowers’ incomes are positively correlated with the project opportunity sets 
available to them, then these results may explain the disparate impact of microfinance programs. 
Interestingly, social sanctions  may work too well by making borrowers  too scared to take on an 
optimal amount of risk. 
 
 
V.A.  Only One Contract Is Offered 
Inspection of Figures 1, 4, and 9 reveals that for the same loan availability and terms,  borrowers’ 
expected net payoffs are higher under individual liability contracts for all projects than under either 
joint liability cases.  
 
 
Proposition  12: In terms  of borrower  expected  utility, the individual  liability  
contract weakly  dominates  the joint  liability contracts  assuming  the  same  
4An additional criterion for maximum societal welfare is the degree that business activity  has a positive externality. If the 
microentrepreneurs invest loans by purchasing capital and hiring labor within their community and the risky projects require 
greater investment than the safe project, then this externality effect would also suggest that more risk taking by, Ceteris 
Paribus, would increase welfare. I show later that if such an externality exists, then my conclusions are even stronger. 
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principal  and interest across contracts (i.e., same r) and only one contract is offered.  
See Appendix for the proof. 
 
However, I also show that the repayment rate under joint liability without social sanctions is higher 
by 25 to 50 percent than the repayment rate under individual liability.  This increase in repayment 
probability is due to the risk sharing benefit when risky projects are taken or to the incentive to take 
safe projects when the payoffs to the risky investment are not very high.   Because the lender can 
expect to be repaid with a higher probability, it will make loans  available to more borrowers by 
rationing credit less and/or reducing the interest rate. 
 
 
If  borrowers  are  able  to  sanction  each  other,  however,  there  actually  may  be  no  effect  on  the 
repayment rate over the individual liability contract if the sanctions are not sufficiently strong and 
average payoffs are not sufficiently high.  This surprising conclusion is due to the lack of risk-sharing 
benefit by groups forming whereby only one borrower takes the risky project.  This is worse than if 
the borrowers both chose to take the risky project because if only one borrower takes the risky 
project and the project pays θL, then there will be no chance of the borrower taking the safe project 
being able to cover for her.   The costs of being punished  by one’s peer are what drive this result. 
 
 
The question has been raised in microfinance circles of whether the joint liability feature of group 
lending is what harnesses the social capital that leads to high repayment rates.  I also demonstrate 
how joint liability contracts can induce greater repayment without peers being able to sanction each 
other.   The mechanism by which joint liability works to increase loan  repayment is not through 
inducing  peers  to  punish  each  other,  but  rather  through  borrowers  sharing  risk  or  through 
cooperatively  avoiding  risk.  If  peers  can  punish  each  other,  however,  joint  liability  does  not 
necessarily work better than individual liability loans. 
 
 
The dominance of the individual liability contract with the constraint that the lender can only offer 
one contract is demonstrated in the proof of the following proposition, which is in the Appendix: 
 
 
V.B.  A Choice of Contract Is Offered  
The microfinance industry has developed to the point that microborrowers have options of taking an 
individual liability or joint liability contract.   In this section, I allow the amount  due, r, to vary 
across contract types, which is dependent on the types of borrowers who may  separate into either 
type of contract.  It also influences which borrower will take a particular contract type. 
 
First, I compare the individual liability loan to the joint liability loan without the possibility of social 
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sanctions.  The following proposition is obtained: 
 
Proposition 14:  If given the choice between an individual liability and joint liability 




< choose the 




≥ choose the joint liability contract.  
The total principal and interest due on the individual liability contract is 150% of that of 
the joint liability contract.  See Appendix for the proof. 




≥ ) prefer the joint liability contract 
because the interest rate is lower because the lender knows that peers share risk with them.  




< ) prefer the individual liability contract because the cost 
imposed by the lender is less than the cost of taking the safe project. 
 
 By offering the individual liability contract in addition to the joint liability contract, the borrowers 
who  otherwise  would  have  invested  in  the  safe  projects  under  joint  liability now  invest  in the 
individual liability contract.  Therefore, everyone invests in the risky project. 
 
 
Next, I compare the individual liability loan to the joint liability loan where there is a possibility of 
social sanctions.  The following lemma and proposition are obtained: 
 
 
Lemma 5:   If given the choice between an individual and joint liability contract 
where there will be social sanctions, borrowers for whom  p*=(R,R) will choose the 
individual liability contract.  See Appendix for the proof. 
 
 
Proposition 15:  If given the choice between an individual liability and joint liability 
loan where there is a possibility of social sanctions, no one will take the joint liability 
contract.  See Appendix for the proof. 
 
 
Therefore, the dominance of the individual liability contract is maintained where there  would be 
social sanctions under a joint liability contract under the general equilibrium assumptions and 
assumption A8 that expected project payoffs are always greater than r/α. If this assumption is 
relaxed, however, then the lower interest rate induced by the possibility of higher repayment under 
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joint liability would cause more people to take these loans who otherwise would not borrow at all. 
 
 
VI.  Empirical Hypotheses 
The conclusions of this study imply some empirical hypotheses using data on the MFI level.  Using 
this level of data is newer in microfinance research because these data have only become available 
within the last decade.  One seminal paper is Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, and Morduch (2009), which 
studies the financial and customer demographic ratios of MFIs as reported by www.mixmarket.org.  
They study such key questions in microfinance as what is the potential tradeoff between MFI 
sustainability and reach to the poorest borrowers. Cull, et.  al.  (2009) find that contract design 
substantially impacts MFI profitability, loan repayment, and costs.  They find that MFIs that make 
individual liability loans experience increases in portfolio quality and profitability when they raise 
interest rates.  Whereas they compare contract types of individual versus group based lending, the 
theory presented here predicts different results among group based lenders based on the social ties 
of their customers.  The difference arises from varying strengths and types of informal institutions 
that impact how group members respond to non-paying peers. 
 
The data used by Cull, et. al. (2009) could be augmented with measures of formal and informal 
institutions within in each of the MFIs’ markets.  If these measures can be obtained and MFIs are 
identified by their mix of making individual and joint liability contracts, then repayment rates across 
the three kinds of lending discussed here could be compared. 
 
This study also has implications for testing using micro level data, which is what the majority of 
studies have used.  If a measure of the project opportunities available to microborrowers can be 
collected, then there are several more testable hypotheses.  Microfinance borrowers with higher 
(lower) possible project payoffs are expected to be more like likely to find peers with similarly higher 
(lower) possible project payoffs.  Microfinance borrowers with higher and more varied possible project 
payoffs are expected to be more likely to match with peers with lower and less varied possible project 
payoffs.  Joint liability borrowers are expected to switch to riskier projects if they switch to receiving 
individual liability loans, especially if they have project opportunities with low upside payoffs. 
 
The empirical testing of this model entails data collection challenges.  First, measures of forbearance 
by culture would require conducting surveys among every identifiable culture served by the MFIs 





Microfinance has popularly been touted as a program that succeeds in improving its borrowers’ 
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incomes by overcoming the moral hazard problem inherent in individual liability loans in countries 
with poor institutions. This paper contributes to theory as to why microfinance does not always work 
as intended. Furthermore, it shows that both formal and informal institutions matter, which could 
lead to certain policy prescriptions according to a country’s institutions. 
 
Given that the whole purpose of microfinance is to promote entrepreneurship, which is inherently a 
risky project, and if the borrower’s prospects are low, then she will not use the funds to make a 
business grow. Rather, she will use it for some other purpose, such as income smoothing. She may 
even forgo her entrepreneurial pursuits in order to be certain to pay back the loan: There have been 
stories of borrowers taking on jobs in cities just to repay their portions of loans rather than working on 
their own businesses. If the real need of these individuals is insurance, then they may benefit 
more by microinsurance programs instead of microlending ones. 
 
On the one hand, the presence of social sanctions in joint liability contracts may inhibit 
entrepreneurial activity among people who would otherwise take business loans as individuals.  On the 
other hand, joint liability contracts can be made to groups with social capital but low payoff project 
opportunities would otherwise not borrow money at all. 
 
There are several testable empirical hypotheses implied by this model that may be tested. First, 
MFIs that make individual liability loans should have lower repayment rates than those that make 
joint liability loans if the group members are unlikely to punish one another for non-contribution. 
Second, MFIs that make individual liability loans should have the same repayment rates as those that 
make joint liability loans where group members are likely to punish one another for non- contribution 
and project payoffs are sufficiently high. To test these first two predictions, one would regress 
repayment rate at the MFI level on the composition of individual liability contracts to total 
contracts, the average measure of social ties among borrowers’ communities, and the average 
measure of potential project payoffs to the borrowers.  Tests using this regression would be most 
powerful with a sample of MFIs that serve identifiably specific types of borrowers by culture and 
economic status.  Third, microfinance borrowers with higher (lower) possible project payoffs will be 
more likely to find peers with similarly  higher (lower) possible project payoffs.  Fourth, 
microfinance borrowers with higher and more varied possible project payoffs will be more likely to 
match with peers with lower and less varied possible project payoffs. Fifth, joint liability loan 
borrowers will be more likely to switch to riskier projects if they switch to receiving individual liability 
loans.  These third, fourth, and fifth predictions would be tested using individual borrower data, which 















i θθθ <<≤0        (A1) 
 
2.  Payoff Probabilities Conditional on Investing in the Risky Project: 
2




ii θθθθ     (A2) 
 
3.  Payoff Probability Conditional on Investing in the Safe Project: 
1)|~( === Sppr i
S
ii θθ        (A3) 
 










)|~(       (A4) 
 
5.  Bank Penalty Parameter Bounds: 
10 ≤< α          (A5) 
 
6.  Social Sanctions Parameter Bounds: 
1≤≤ βα          (A6) 
 
7.  Low State Payoff Bounds: 
αα
βθ rrLi <<≤0         (A7) 
 






2<<          (A8) 
 
9.  High State Payoff Bounds: 
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<2          (A9) 
 
 
Proposition 1:  An individual liability borrower’s optimal repayment strategy (s*) implies the 
utility (UI) of the individual liability loan to be convex in her project’s payoffs (θ~ ). 
 
Proof: 
UI[s(θ~ ),θ~ ] is the utility of individual liability borrower from playing s ∈  (C, NC) and realizing 
outcome θ~ . 
 
UI(C, θ~ ) = θ~ - r         (1) 
 




θ r≥~  , then UI(C, θ~ ) - UI(NC, θ~ ) ≥ 0.  Therefore, s*(
α




θ r<~  , then UI(C, θ~ ) - UI(NC, θ~ ) < 0.  Therefore, s*(
α
θ r<~ ) = NC. (4) 
 
Therefore, individual liability borrower’s utility under her optimal repayment strategy is as follows 























]~),~(*[       (5) 
 
Since 0 < α < 1, (5) is a convex function. 
 
 
Proposition 2:  An individual liability borrower’s optimal investment decision (p*) is to take the 
risky project (R) rather than the safe project (S). 
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Proof: 
)]~*,(E[U Ip θs  is the expected utility of individual liability borrower from take project p∈ (R, S) 
according to playing her optimal repayment strategy (s*). 
 
The expected utilities from investing in the risky (R) and safe (S) project (p): 
 





1)]~*,(E[ HILIIR sUsUsU θθθ +=  












and suppressing the arguments of 
I







+−= αθθ          (7) 
 
If p = S: 
)*,()]~*,(E[ SIIS sUsU θθ =         (8) 
rEU SIS −= θ           (9) 
 










αθ−=−         (10) 
Since, by assumption, 
α










R         (11) 
 
Therefore, the expected utility to the individual liability borrower of investing in the risky project 
exceeds that of investing in the safe project, i.e., p* = R.  
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Proposition 3:  The expected repayment rate of an individual liability loan is 50 percent. 
 
Proof: 
)~*,( θsV I  is the ex post value to the lender from making an individual liability loan conditional on 
the project payoffs and the borrower’s optimal repayment strategy. 
 
























        (i) 
)~*,( θsEV IP  is the expected value to the lender of making an individual liability loan conditional on 














rsEV IP =⋅+⋅=θ   (ii) 
 





= 50%.   
 
 
Lemma 1.1:  The unique Nash Equilibrium strategy (s*) for both borrowers under a joint liability 







   
)~,(1 θsU J is the value to borrower 1 under a joint liability contract from playing s = (s1, s2), where s1 
∈  (C1, NC1) , s2 ∈  (C2, NC2), and )~,~(~ 21 θθθ = . 
 
)1(~]~),,[( 1
1 αθθ −=NCNCU J        (12) 
 
rNCCU J 2~]~),,[( 1
1 −= θθ         (13) 
 
Subtracting (13) from (12): 0]~),,[(]~),,[( 11 >− θθ NCCUNCNCU JJ  since 
α
θ r2~1 < .  The same 
applies to )~,(2 θsU J .  Therefore, s* = (NC, NC) when 
α
θ r2~1 <  and α
θ r2~2 < . 
 
 
Lemma 1.2:  The unique Nash Equilibrium strategy (s*) under joint liability contract is for the 
borrower with the project payoffs greater than or equal to 
a
r2
 to pay for both loans and the borrower 
with project payoff less than 
a
r2





θ r2~1 ≥  and α
θ r22 < . 
 
From (12) and (13): 
rNCNCUNCCU JJ 2~]~),,[(]~),,[( 1
11 −=− θαθθ      (14) 
 
(14) is greater than zero since 
α
θ r2~1 ≥ .  Therefore, borrower would not deviate from playing C. 
 
Applying (12) and (13) to borrower 2 
rCCUNCCU JJ =− ]~),,[(]~),,[( 12 θθ        (15) 
 
(15) is greater than zero.  Therefore, borrower 2 will not deviate from playing NC. 
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Therefore, s*=(C, NC) when 
α
θ r2~1 ≥  and α
θ r2~2 < , and by the same reasoning, s*=(NC, C) when 
α
θ r2~1 <  and α
θ r2~2 ≥ . 
 
 
Lemma 1.3:  The unique Nash Equilibrium strategy (s*) under a joint liability contract is for both 



















2 <≤ . 
 
rCCU J −= 1
1 ~]~),,[( θθ         (16) 
 
1
1 ~]~),,[( θθ =CNCU J          (17) 
 
Subtracting (17) from (16): 
rNCCUNCNCU JJ −=− ]~),,[(]~),,[( 11 θθ       (18) 
 
Since (18) is less than zero, borrower 1 would like to deviate from playing C to NC if borrower 2 does 











2 <≤ , the right hand side of (19) is strictly greater than zero:  0
~2 2 >−≥ θαrr .  
Therefore, borrower 2 would respond to borrower 1 deviating by also deviating.  Because both 
borrowers know that deviating from C to NC induces the peer to doing likewise, neither borrower 
35
   
will deviate from playing C if the marginal value to each borrower from the group playing (C,C) over 
(NC,NC) is positive: 
 
From (12) and (16): 
rNCNCUCCU JJ −=− θαθθ ~]~),,[(]~),,[( 11       (20) 
 





1 <≤ .  Therefore, neither borrower will deviate from 









2 <≤ . 
 
 
Lemma 1.4:  The only Nash Equilibrium strategies (s*) under a joint liability contract is for only one 
borrower to contribute to repayment of the loan for both [(C,NC) or (NC,C)] if both projects’ payoffs 






From (12) and (13): 
 
rNCNCUNCCU JJ 2~]~),,[(]~),,[( 2




θ r2~1 ≥ , the right hand side of (21) is greater than or equal to zero.  Therefore, borrower 1 will 
not deviate from playing C. 
 
 
From (13) and (16): 
rCCUNCCU JJ =− ]~),,[(]~),,[( 22 θθ       (22) 
 
Since the right hand side of (22) is positive, borrower 2 will not deviate from playing NC. 
 
However, the same logic applies to show that it is also a Nash Equilibrium for borrower 1 to not 
contribute and borrower 2 to contribute.  Therefore, )],(),,[(* CNCNCCs = . 
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Proposition 4:  Under a joint liability contract, if one borrower invests in the safe project, then the 





θsUE J PP  is the expected value to borrower 1 from borrower 1 taking project P1 and borrower 2 
taking project P2 according to both players’ optimal contribution strategies (s*) and payoff 
possibilities (θ~ ). 
 
If P1 = R and P2 = S, then by Lemma 1.1 and Lemma 1.2: 
 
 ),(),(* 21 NCNCs
SL =θθ        (23) 
 
 ),(),(* 21 NCCs


























αθθ         (25) 
 
If P1 = R and P2 = S, then by Lemma 1.3: 
 
  ),(),(* 21 CCs
SS =θθ        (26) 
 
Therefore, 
rsUEU SSSJJSS −== 121
11 )],(*,[ θθθ        (27) 
 
To compare the marginal value to borrower 1 from taking the safe project over the risky project when 
borrower 2 takes the safe project, subtract (25) from (27): 
37












αθαθθθ =−−−−=−      (28) 
 
Because the right hand side of (28) is greater than or equal to zero, borrower 1 will invest in the safe 
project if borrower 2 invests in the safe project.  I.e., SP =*1 if SP =2 . 
 
 
Proposition 5:  Under a joint liability contract, if one borrower invests in the risky project, then the 
other borrower will invest in the risky project only if her projects’ high state payoff is greater than 
α
r3
.  Otherwise, she will invest in the safe project. 
 
Proof: 
If P1=P2=R, by Lemmas 1.1, 1.2, and 1.4: 
 
 ),(),(* 21 NCNCs
LL =θθ        (29) 
 
 ),(),(* 21 CNCs
HL =θθ        (30) 
 
 ),(),(* 21 NCCs
LH =θθ        (31) 
 
)],(),,[(),(* 21 CNCNCCs
HH =θθ       (32) 
 



















































HHHLL rr θθθθαθ +−+−++−=  
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αθθ         (32) 
 
If P1=S and P2=R, by Lemmas 1.1 and 1.2: 
 
 ),(),(* 21 NCNCs
LS =θθ        (33) 
 
 ),(),(* 21 CNCs
HS =θθ        (34) 
 
Therefore, the expected value to borrower 1 from taking the safe project when borrower 2 takes the 





















S αθθ −=          (35) 
 
To compare the marginal value to borrower 1 from taking the risky project over the safe project when 










































        (37) 
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rH <θ .  








rH <θ . 
 
 
Lemma 2: The expected value to one borrower of a joint liability contract when both borrowers 



















rL <1θ , the right hand side of (38) is greater than zero.  Therefore, both borrowers prefer 
to choose the same investment strategies of P1=P2=S or P1=P2=R. 
 
 
Corollary 1:  Borrowers with high possible project payoffs (
a
rH 3>θ ) select each other to take joint 
liability loans and invest in risky projects.  Other borrowers (
a
rH 3<θ ) select each other and invest 
in safe projects. 
 
Proof: 
Following Proposition 4 there is only a possibility of P1=P2=S or P1=P2=R because it is not possible 
for one borrower to invest in the safe project and the other to invest in the risky project.  Lemma 2 
shows that both borrowers would prefer that they both invest in the risky project.  From Proposition 
5, it is only the borrowers who have high state payoffs under the risky investment who can commit to 
investing in the risky project when her peer does the same.  Therefore, borrowers who can commit to 
not deviating from investing in the risky project when they both agree to do so would prefer to match 
with each other.  The borrowers who cannot make such a commitment will be forced to match with 
other such borrowers.  Therefore, the borrowers with the very high state payoff possibilities will 
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match with each other and invest in risky projects; the borrowers with the moderately high state 
payoff possibilities will match with each other and invest in safe projects. 
 
 
Proposition 6:  The expected repayment rate of a joint liability loan is between 75 and 100 percent. 
 
Proof: 
Let ]1,0[∈ψ  be the fraction of borrowers with 
a




θsEV JPP  is the expected value per borrower to the lender from making a joint liability loan to a 
group conditional on borrowers’ investment choices (P1 and P2). 
 
By equation (26): 
 rrsEV JSS == 2/2)
~*,( θ   (39) 
 








1)~*,( rrrsEV JRR ==⋅+⋅=θ   (40) 
 
EVJ is the expected value to the lender per borrower from making a joint liability loan to a group 







3)1( ψψψψ −+=−+=  
4
)3( rψ+=   (41) 
 




)3( ψψ +=+= rr , which is bounded between ¾ and 




    
Lemma 3.1:  The unique Nash Equilibrium strategy (s*) for both borrowers under a joint liability 
contract with a possibility of social sanctions is to not contribute to the loan repayment when both 






JS ≡ joint liability contract with a possibility of social sanctions 
 
)1(~]~)],,[( 1
1 αθθ −=NCNCU JS   (42) 
 
rNCCU JS 2~]~)],,[( 1
1 −= θθ   (43) 
 
To compare the value of not contributing over contributing, subtract (43) from (42): 
 
1
11 ~2]~)],,[(]~)],,[( θαθθ −=− rNCCUNCNCU JSJS   (44) 
 




, to equation (44): 
02]~)],,[(]~)],,[( 11 >−>− rrNCCUNCNCU JSJS βθθ  
 
The same logic applies to the borrower 2.  Therefore, s*=(NC,NC) when 
α
βθ r<1  and α
βθ r<2 . 
 
Lemma 3.2:   The unique Nash Equilibrium strategy (s*) under a joint liability contract and 
possibility of social sanctions is for the borrower with project payoffs greater than 
α
r2
 to contribute 
to the repayment of the loan for both borrowers and for the borrower with project payoffs less than 
α
βr











    
To compare the value of contributing over not contributing for borrower 1, subtract (42) from (43): 
 
rNCNCUNCCU JSJS 2~]~)],,[(]~)],,[( 1̀
11 −=− θαθθ   (45) 
 
Applying this case, i.e., 
α
θ r2~1 ≥ , to equation (45): 0
~)],,[(]~)],,[( 11 ≥− θθ NCNCUNCCU JSJS .  





αθθ −=NCCU JS   (46) 
 
rCCU JS −= 2
2 ~]~)],,[( θθ   (47) 
 





]~)],,[(]~)],,[( −=− rCCUNCCU JSJS   (48) 
 




, to (48): 0]~)],,[(]~)],,[( 22 >− θθ CCUNCCU JSJS .   Therefore, 




θ r2~1̀ ≥  and α
βθ r<2`
~
, ),(* NCCs = , and vice versa. 
 
 
Lemma 3.3:  The unique Nash Equilibrium strategy (s*) under a joint liability contract with 
possibility of social sanctions is for both borrowers to contribute to the repayment of the loan if one’s 
project pays off 
α
r2













    
 








)~(~]~),,[(]~),,[(   (49) 
 
Applying this case, i.e. 
α
θ r2~1 ≥  to (49):  0]
~),,[(]~),,[( 11 ≥− θθ CNCUCCU JSJS .  Therefore, borrower 
1 will not deviate from contributing to repayment. 
 
 








)~(~]~),,[(]~),,[(    (50) 
 




to (50): 0]~),,[(]~),,[( 22 ≥− θθ NCCUCCU JSJS .  Therefore, 
borrower 2 will not deviate from contributing to repayment. 
 
So, when one project pays 
α
r2
or more and the other project pays 
α
βr
 or more, s*=(C,C). 
 
 
Lemma 3.4:  The unique Nash Equilibrium strategy (s*) under a joint liability contract with the 
possibility of social sanctions is for neither borrower to contribute to the repayment of the loan if one 
project payoffs less than 
α
βr


















11 ~2]~)],,[(]~)],,[( θαθθ −=− rNCCUNCNCU JSJS  
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1 ≤<  to the above:  
0]~)],,[(]~)],,[()2( 11 >−≥− θθβ NCCUNCNCUr JSJS . 
 





0]~)],,[(]~)],,[( 22 >− θθ NCCUNCNCU JSJS . 
 
Therefore, neither borrower deviates from this strategy.  So, s* = (NC,NC). 
 
 
Proposition 7:  If 
α
βθ rL <1  and borrower 2 invests in the safe project, then borrower 1 will invest 




If P1=R and P2=S, then by Lemmas 3.4 and 3.3: 
 
 ),(),(* 21 NCNCs
SL =θθ      (51) 
 
 ),(),(* 21 CCs
SH =θθ      (52) 
  
Therefore, the expected value to borrower 1 from taking the risky project when her peer takes the 

























αθθ          (54) 
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If P1= P2=S, then by Lemma 3.3: 
 
 ),(),(* 21 CCs
SS =θθ         (55) 
 
Therefore, the expected value to borrower 1 from taking the safe project when her peer does likewise 
is: 
 
rEU SJSSS −= 1
1 θ          (56) 
 
To compare the marginal value to borrower 1 from taking the risky project over the safe project when 





















θθαθθ −=−−+−=−      (57) 
 
Apply this case, i.e., 
α
βθ rL <1 , to (57):  02
)1(11 >−>− βrEUEU JSSS
JS
RS .  Therefore, borrower 1 will 
invest in the risky project when her peer invests in the safe project and her risky project’s low state 





Proposition 8:  If 
α
βθ rL <1 and borrower 2 invests in the risky project, then borrower 1 will take 






rS +≥ .  Otherwise, borrower 1 will take the safe project. 
 
Proof: 
If P1=P2=R, then by Lemmas 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3: 
 
 ),(),(* 21 NCNCs
LL =θθ        (58) 
 
 ),(),(* 21 CNCs
HL =θθ        (59) 
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 ),(),(* 21 NCCs
LH =θθ        (60) 
 
 ),(),(* 21 CCs
HH =θθ         (61) 
 


































































θ       (63) 
 
 
If P1=S and P2=R, then by Lemmas 3.4 and 3.3: 
 
 ),(),(* 21 NCNCs
LS =θθ        (64) 
 
 ),(),(* 21 CCs
HS =θθ         (65) 
 
Therefore, the expected value to borrower 1 from taking the safe project when her peer takes the 











SR sUsUEU θθθθ +=  
47













αθθ          (66) 
 
To compare the marginal value of borrower 1 taking the risky project over the safe project when her 












       (67) 
 
A necessary and sufficient condition for the right hand side of (67) to be greater than or equal to zero 







rS +≥          (68) 
 





, then she invests in the 









then she invests in the safe project. 
 
 
Lemma 4.1:  For the borrower who will always choose the risky project, it is preferable for her to 









rS +≥ , then borrower 1 will invest in the risky project when her peer invests in the risky 
project (Proposition 8) or if her peer invests in the safe project (Proposition 7).  The relative value of 
finding a peer who will invest in the safe risky project when she invests in the risky project over one 
who will invest in the safe project is determined by subtracting (54) from (62): 
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θ  (69) 
 






values having a peer who will invest in the safe project. 
 
 
Lemma 4.2:  For the borrower who will invest in the safe project when her peer invests in the risky 











Proposition 7 states that if one borrower invests in the safe project, then the other will invest in the 
risky project.  Proposition 8 states that if the expected project payoffs are low, then a borrower will 
maintain investment in the safe project when her peer invests in the risky project.  If both borrowers 
have low expected project payoffs, then their optimal investment strategy, ),(* SRP = or 
),(* RSP = .  There is no a priori reason for either borrower to expect that she will be the one to play 
the risky investment strategy.  Therefore, both will expect to play either strategy equally.   
 
The expected value for a borrower with low expected payoffs (borrower 1) from having a peer with 

















θθαθ ++−=+       (70) 
 
If the peer has high expected payoffs, however, the borrower with low expected payoffs is assured to 
always invest in the safe project because she cannot credibly commit to the risky strategy and the 
high expected payoff borrower will always invest in the risky project (Proposition 8).   
 
The expected value for a borrower with low expected payoffs (borrower 1) from having a peer with 
high expected payoffs is given in (64). 
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The marginal value to the low expected payoff borrower from having a peer with similarly a low 

















     (71) 
 
 
Proposition 9:  Borrowers will match with other borrowers with the same expected project payoffs 
where there is a possibility of social sanctions. 
 
Proof: 
Borrowers with low expected project payoffs prefer to invest in the risky project (Lemma 4.2). 
 
These borrowers cannot credibly commit to invest in the risky project with a peer with high project 
payoffs because the peer would always invest in the risky project (Proposition 8). 
 
Therefore, the only chance the low expected project payoffs borrower has to play the risky strategy is 
to match with a borrower with low expected project payoffs, too (Proposition 7). 
 
 
Proposition 10:  The only investment strategies that will be played are P1=P2=R for groups with 
high expected project payoffs and P1≠P2 for groups with low expected project payoffs. 
 
Proof: 
This follows from Propositions 7, 8, and 9. 
 
 
Proposition 11:  The expected repayment rate of a joint liability loan with the possibility of social 
sanctions is between 50 percent and 75 percent. 
 
Proof: 




)2( rr S +<< . 
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)~*,(
21
θsEV JSPP  is the expected value per borrower to the lender from making a joint liability loan to a 

















RS =⋅+⋅== θθ      (73) 
 
The expected value to the lender is the weighted average of (72) and (73) by the distribution of all 






JS φφφ −=+−=       (74) 
 







1 ≤−≤ φ           (75) 
 
 
Proposition 12:  In terms of borrower expected utility, the individual liability contract weakly 
dominates the joint liability contracts assuming the same principal and interest across contracts (i.e., 
same r).   
 
Proof: 
Case 1:  Borrowers with low expected payoffs 
      
From Proposition 2, Corollary 1, and Proposition 10 for borrower 1 with 
α


















p EUEUEU ∈ .   
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The value of the individual liability contract over the joint liability contract without the possibility of 














        (76) 
 
The value of the individual liability contract over the joint liability contract with the possibility of 













p EUEU θθα        (78) 
 
Case 2:  Borrowers with high expected payoffs 
 
From Proposition 2, Corollary 1, and Proposition 10 for borrower 1 with 
α
















p EUEU = .   
 
The value of the individual liability contract over the joint liability contract without the possibility of 















        (79) 
 
The value of the individual liability contract over the joint liability contract with the possibility of 















EUEU         (80) 
 
 
Proposition 14:  If given the choice between an individual liability and joint liability contract 
without the possibility of social sanctions, borrowers with 
α
θ rHi
3<  choose the individual liability 
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contract and those with 
α
θ rHi
3≥ choose the joint liability contract.  The total principal and interest 
due on the individual liability contract is 150% of that of the joint liability contract. 
 
Proof: 
Let rI be the amount due for the individual contract and rJ be the amount due for the joint liability 
contract without the possibility of social sanctions. 
 














ψ+=          (82) 
 
If the lender were to choose rI relative to rJ such that the expected values to the lender is equal, then 







ψ+=           (83) 
 
The borrower will choose the individual liability loan over the joint liability loan if 




p rEUrEU .  Otherwise, she will choose the joint liability loan. 
 
Case 1:  p*=(R,R) 
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Therefore, borrowers for whom p* = (R, R) (those with 
α
θ rHi
3≥ ) will always select the joint liability 
contract. 
 
Case 2: p*=(S,S) 
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Use the assumption that 
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Therefore, borrowers for whom p*=(S, S) (those with 
α
θ rHi




 Since the borrowers will separate in this way, the lender believes that 0=ψ .  Therefore, 




r = , where rI* and rJ* are the equilibrium amounts due for both the 
individual and joint liability contracts. 
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The lender values the joint liability contract at the general equilibrium amount due, rJ*, at (82) 















EV JJp . 
 
Comment 1:  Borrowers with better prospects (
α
θ rHi
3≥ ) prefer the joint liability contract because 
the interest rate is lower because the lender knows that their peers share risk with them.  Borrowers 
with lesser prospects (
α
θ rHi
3< ) prefer the individual liability contract because the cost imposed by 
the lender is less than the cost of taking the safe project. 
 
 
Comment 2:  Everyone invests in the risky project. 
 
 
Lemma 5:  If given the choice between an individual and joint liability contract where there will be 
social sanctions, a borrowers for whom p*=(R,R) will choose the individual liability contract. 
 
Proof: 
Let rJS be the amount due under a joint liability contract with the possibility of social sanctions. 
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If the lender were to choose rI relative to rJS such that the expected values to the lender is equal, 
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p EUEU .  Otherwise, she will choose the joint liability loan. 
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Therefore, if p*=(R,R), then the borrowers prefer the individual liability contract. 
 
 
Proposition 15:  If given the choice between an individual liability and joint liability loan where 
there is a possibility of social sanctions, no one will take the joint liability contract.   
 
Proof: 
If anyone does take the joint liability contract, it would be the borrowers with lower expected project 
payoffs because Lemma 5 shows that the high expected project payoff borrowers will definitely 
choose the individual liability contract.  These lower expected project payoff borrowers are those who 
would play (R,S) or (S,R) investment strategies.  Therefore, if the joint liability contract is taken by 
at least one group, 1=φ . 
 
Compare the expected values from taking the individual liability loan to the joint liability loan with 
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As explained above, if this contract is accepted by anyone, it is by the lower expected payoff 
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Floating rate convertibles (FRCs) are a category of PIPE securities that receive negative associations 
in both the academic and professional literature, earning monikers such as “death spirals” because of 
significant negative returns to equity of firms subsequent to issuing them.  This study sheds light on 
the managerial relationship to the decision to issue FRCs and to the variation in market response to 
these issues.  One main result of the study identifies influence of the CFO relative to the CEO as 
significant in the decision to issue FRCs and in the market’s immediate reaction to the issuance.  
Another main result is that FRC issuing firms with CFOs without prior public equity issuance 
experience have significantly negative long run abnormal returns, whereas FRC issuing firms with 
experienced CFOs do not.  Overall, I find support for the faulty contract design hypothesis for the 
firms with less experienced CFOs and a new hypothesis consistent with optimal security design 




I. Introduction  
Since 1995, a growing number of public firms have raised funds through issues of private investment 
in public equity (PIPEs). PIPEs are common stock, preferred stock, convertible debt, convertible 
preferred stock, stock warrants, and equity lines, which are sold to investors privately by public 
firms. While private issuances of stock took place prior to 1995, that was the year in which the term, 
PIPE, came into use. PIPEs are typically more than solely straight equity deals, but those that 
include asymmetric payoff features such as that of a warrant.  
 
PIPEs typically have been seen as solutions to an information asymmetry problem that firms, 
particularly small growth ones, face when needing to raise external funds publicly. Through the 
private negotiations preceding a private issue, information can be conveyed to the investor at less 
cost than in a public issue. Nevertheless, some private placement advisors are critical of a significant 
number of PIPE deals, contending that these deals’ terms are harmful to the issuing firms.  
 
Given the theoretical benefit of PIPE issues in solving the information asymmetry problem and the 
fact that firms choose to enter into deals that have been deemed harmful, why question the net 
benefit of any PIPE to the firm?  Investors in PIPEs that contain the arguably adverse terms for the 
firm are primarily hedge funds, which make their profit on arbitrage opportunities and not on the 
long run performance of the firms. According to these funds’ detractors, they trick PIPE issuers to 
accept “bad” deals because issuing firm managers are unsophisticated or have personal connections 
to the funds. The criticism says that the principal-agency conflict between shareholders and 
management cause firms to issue PIPEs with “bad” terms.  
 
A type of PIPE that has come under particular scrutiny is the floating rate convertible (FRC), which 
is either a preferred stock or a bond that is convertible into common stock at a price determined by 
the future stock price at the time of conversion. Chaplinsky and Haushalter (2003), Hillion and 
Vermaelen (2004), and others have studied the firms issuing FRCs. They and finance practitioners 
have found a negative relationship between the issuance of a floating rate convertible (FRC) and 
firm performance.  
 
Existing evidence supports two theories for this relationship. The first, the faulty contract design 
(FCD) hypothesis, states that firms mistakenly issue FRCs because they do not understand how they 
will impact long term performance. The second theory, the financing of last resort (FLR) hypothesis, 
states that firms rationally issue FRCs because they face severe information asymmetry problems 
and are unable to find financing elsewhere. This second theory states that these firms’ poor 
performances are simply anticipated by the FRCs themselves. Hindsight indicates that certain FRCs 
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are not good financing options. Why then are they issued in the first place? How could have one 
predicted a poor financing decision? And by implication, how can one predict poor financing decisions 
by firms now? I model the FRC issue choice as a function of CFO characteristics. This approach 
yields interesting answers to the question of whether FRC issues precipitate or simply anticipate 
poor future performance. It also addresses an interesting question of whether the degree and type of 
sophistication of financial managers add value to the firm.  
 
I show that the financial sophistication does indeed affect the FRC issuance decision and affects how 
the market reacts to the issue.  Firms where the CFOs are more highly compensated relative to their 
CEOs are more likely to issue FRCs.  Among FRC issuing firms, those with higher CFO-to-CEO 
compensation have lower abnormal returns around the issuance announcements.  In the long-term, 
FRC issuing firms whose CFOs do not have experience accessing the public equity market have 
significantly negative stock returns.  These findings support the FCD hypothesis where the CFO has 
less experience.  In addition, they support an alternative hypothesis of optimal security design (OSD) 
where the CFO does have experience. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on PIPEs and impact of financial 
management on firm actions and performance. Section 3 discusses the sources of the data, 
methodology for identifying control firms, and summary statistics. Section 4 presents hypotheses, 
including an introduction of the optimal security design (OSD) hypothesis to the FRC literature.  
Section 5 analyzes the results of testing the hypothesis. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature  
This study brings together two strands of financial research. The first is on the motivation and 
impact of PIPE issues, particularly structured PIPE issues. The existing literature has come to 
support two major hypotheses for why a firm would issue a floating rate convertible security (FRC): 
the faulty contract design hypothesis and financing of last resort hypothesis. I join this research area 
to another strand, which is how CFOs’ incentives and abilities along with directors’ financial ties 
affect financing actions of firms.  
 
A.  Private Investment in Public Equity (PIPEs)  
How does a firm benefit from privately placing equity when it is already a registered public firm?  In 
a Myers and Majluf (1984) framework, a private issue could be a less costly way of conveying 
information to the market while raising new equity. At the heart of Myers and Majluf’s model is 
information asymmetry between a firm and potential outside investors. In bad states, the firm 
knows that its stock is overvalued. In this case, the firm has the reason to issue new equity because 
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it is overvalued. The market, then, would know whether the bad state of the world has been realized, 
and firm’s stock price would decline. If outside financing is necessary to invest in a positive net 
present value project, then some such projects would not be taken. How, then, can this suboptimal 
investment policy be avoided? If information on the true value of the assets and growth opportunities 
can be conveyed, then an issue of equity would not be a negative signal. However, transmission of 
this information to the public is costly. For example, it may entail giving away trade secrets.  
 
Theoretically, the certification benefit of PIPE issues is found in Hertzel and Smith (1993), which is 
an extension of Myers and Majluf (1984)’s model of information asymmetry and security selection. 
Hertzel and Smith (1993) suggest that private placements of equity can serve as a less costly way to 
convey information to the market and thus allow for a more optimal investment decision rule in the 
Myers and Majluf framework. By issuing stock privately, a firm can convey information through the 
negotiations with the investors, raise the capital it needs, and signal to the market that it is issuing 
stock because of good growth prospects.  Hertzel and Smith postulate and test that firms sell their 
privately placed stock at a discount to pay for the due diligence costs.  
 
The certification benefit of PIPEs is supported by the observation that the market reacts positively to 
the announcement of PIPE issues even though they are typically issued at a discount to market 
price. Hertzel and Smith (1993) strictly consider placements of common stock, and Chaplinsky and 
Haushalter (2003) consider all PIPEs issued between 1995 and 2000. Consistent with Hertzel and 
Smith, Chaplinksy and Haushalter find positive announcement returns for PIPEs. They also find 
that PIPEs with features that protect investors against declines in stock prices have lower 
announcement returns than those with such protections. Examples of securities with downside price 
protections are floating rate convertible debt and floating rate convertible preferred stock (FRCs). 
They infer that the market interprets the terms as signals of the quality of the firms’ prospects, 
because they indicate that the issuing firms agree to the investors’ concern that the firms’ stock 
prices will decline in the future. The convertible security holder may convert at a low stock price, 
forcing the firm to give more shares of stock than it would at the time of the security’s issuance. 
Terms with less downside protection indicates that private investors have greater confidence in the 
firm’s future performance. In other words, the structured nature of the PIPE signals that the 
investor is unable to certify the value of the firm.  
 
Studies on PIPE issuing firm performance that control for identity of the investor supports the 
notion that there is a certification effect. Dai (2007) directly examines how VC’s and hedge funds 
differ in their relationship to PIPE issuing firms, finding that VCs tend to have seats on the issuing 
firms’ boards of directors and to have longer investment horizons than hedge funds. She finds 
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support for the argument that VCs provide certification to the PIPE issuers in which they invest. 
Similarly, Krishnamurthy, Spindt, Subramaniam, and Woidtke (2004) find that the negative long 
run abnormal returns of firms after issuing PIPEs are confined to the sample of nondistressed firms 
that issue to nonaffiliated investors. Distressed firms, on the other hand, show a positive 
announcement effect and no long-run underperformance regardless of whether the investors are 
affiliated or unaffiliated. This provides support to the hypothesis that the identity of the investor 
provides a certification benefit.  
 
Consistent with other studies (Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Dai, 2007; Krishnamurthy, et. al., 2004; and 
Barclay, et. al. 2003), Brophy, et. al. (2006)¸ do not find support for a monitoring benefit in PIPE 
issues. The monitoring hypothesis states that since PIPEs are issued to a block holder, the free-
riding problem of equity issuance to disperse shareholders is circumvented. The argument for a 
monitoring benefit is set forth by Wruck (1989), who postulates that private placements enhance 
value by targeting a small number of investors rather than a large number typical in a public issue. 
By concentrating ownership, investors are capable of monitoring the firm more carefully. The 
discount that private investors usually receive, therefore, compensates for monitoring costs 
according to Wruck’s ownership concentration hypothesis. Hertzel and Smith, however, find that the 
ownership concentration variable does not have statistical significance in a regression of abnormal 
returns in the presence of certification variables. Barclay, Holderness, and Sheehan (2003) find that 
investors in PIPEs typically are passive, and therefore they actually serve to entrench management, 
which they argue is why PIPE issues are typically followed by long run negative abnormal returns.  
 
Despite the support for a certification effect motivating the issuance of PIPEs at discounts, PIPE 
issuers also tend to experience negative long run abnormal returns following the issue. This is 
documented by Hertzel, et. al. (2002) and Chaplinsky and Haushalter (2003). Why then are PIPEs 
issued?  
 
One explanation is faulty contract design (FCD) hypothesis, which states that firms issue FRCs 
because their managements do not recognize that the securities induce short selling in their firms’ 
stock; the investors of these FRC buy the shares in order to profit from anticipated manipulation of 
the stock price to the detriment of the existing share holders. Even among nonstructured PIPE 
issues, Hertzel, et. al. (2002) find a negative post-event performance, despite a positive 
announcement effect for private placements of equity. They interpret this result as indicating that 
the issuing firm management is overly optimistic concerning growth opportunities. They speculate 
that, rather than covering due diligence or monitoring costs, the discounts on privately placed stock 
indicate that the investors in these issues are better informed concerning the firms’ true lower value. 
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They do recognize such a story is inconsistent with an efficient market because, while privately 
issued stock are sold at a discount, the market prices of existing stock are higher when the deals are 
announced.  
 
Another explanation is the financing of last resort (FLR) hypothesis, which states that the issuing 
firm needs external financing, and despite the costliness of the issuance, it will do so out of 
desperation. Indeed, Chaplinsky and Haushalter (2003) find that over 80 percent of PIPE issuing 
firms have negative operating income prior to an issue. They say that companies using PIPEs 
“appear to be highly distressed and have a high probability of failure regardless of the actions taken 
by management. Therefore, it is difficult to judge the success of these contracts based solely on the 
issuer’s post issue performance.” (Chaplinsky and Haushalter’s study of PIPEs is restricted to the 
1990s. Since 2000, however, PIPE financing has become more common among healthier firms.)  
 
B.  Structured PIPEs 
If a non-structured PIPE provides a certification benefit, and the market reacts negatively to the 
issue of a structured PIPE, then why would a firm opt to issue a structured PIPE? The development 
of hypotheses concerning relationship between FRCs and their long run return and operating 
performance of their issuers is most comprehensively set forth in Hillion and Vermalaen (2004). 
They test the faulty contract design (FCD) hypothesis, and financing of last resort (FLR) hypothesis, 
as well as a third, the undervaluation hypothesis.  
 
The undervaluation hypothesis states that firms issue FRCs because their price is undervalued. 
Therefore, they issue a convertible security that converts at a future market price that the firm 
believes will match its true value.  
 
Using a dataset of all FRC issues from December 1994 – July 1998, Hillion and Vermaelen reject the 
undervaluation hypothesis and find support for both the faulty contract design (FCD) and financing 
of last resort (FLR) hypotheses. They reject the undervaluation hypothesis because firms that issue 
FRCs typically experience significant negative abnormal returns in the years following issuance. 
Their support for the FCD hypothesis follows from supporting several empirical predictions of this 
hypothesis. While negative abnormal returns would be expected under both the FCD hypothesis and 
the FLR hypothesis, the reasons are different. One unique prediction of the FCD hypothesis, for 
which the authors finds support, is that the conversion discount is negatively correlated with the 
abnormal returns of the issuing firm and with the size of the issue.  A unique prediction of the FLR 
hypothesis is that the negative abnormal returns of an FRC issuing firm is accompanied by negative 
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abnormal operating performance because the issuance of the FRC is interpreted as a signal of future 
problems for the firm. The authors find that this prediction holds also.  
 
Chaplinsky and Haushalter (2003) consider all PIPE issues from 1995 – 2000. This study not only 
considers more deals than Hillion and Vermaelen, but also provides further evidence of long run 
abnormal performance of FRC issuers by comparing them to firms that issue PIPEs that do not 
provide the downside price protection to the holders of the securities, such as straight equity and 
fixed rate convertible securities.  
 
Brophy, Ouimet, and Sialm (2006) support the FLR hypothesis despite finding a relationship 
between negative abnormal returns and the PIPE investor being more likely to be involved in short 
selling. Specifically, they argue that firms issue FRCs as a last resort when they issue to hedge 
funds. They find that the long run underperformance of traditional PIPEs is confined to the sample 
of firms issuing structured PIPEs to hedge funds. This finding is consistent with the FCD hypothesis 
because hedge funds are not long term investors, but often engage in significant amounts of short 
selling and operate by taking advantage of arbitrages (Dai, 2007). Nevertheless, the authors do not 
accept the FCD hypothesis because the amount of short positions on firms issuing structured PIPEs 
to hedge funds does not vary significantly from the short positions of other deals. Therefore, they 
argue that these negative abnormal returns are due to these firms having the severest asymmetric 
information and agency problems, risks that only hedge funds are able to hedge against. They also 
find that PIPE issuing firms that were backed by a venture capitalist before IPOing do not 
experience the long run underperformance of other PIPE issuers. Their interpretation of this finding 
is that VCs provide certification of these firms and therefore do not have the adverse selection 
problems of firms without VC backing.  
 
In summary of the literature on PIPEs, the motivation for the issuance is concluded to be despair 
(FLR hypothesis) and/or ignorance (FCD hypothesis).  A puzzling finding in the empirical literature, 
however, is that there are long run negative abnormal returns to firms making private placements. 
Explanations for the puzzle have been based on a lack firm management sophistication (ignorance; 
faulty contract design) or the market’s slowness to recognize that the underlying conditions of the 
issuer (despair; financing of last resort). Support has been provided for both explanations. 
Observation of the level of sophistication and incentives of the issuing firm’s financial management 
would serve to disentangle the faulty contract design hypothesis from the financing of last resort 
hypothesis. The literature has yet to incorporate such a control and therefore has not fully answered 
the question of how much the security choice affects the value of the firm rather than merely 
signaling its existing value.  
67
 
C. Financial Managers  
Despite Hillion and Vermaelen (2004)’s observation that the amount of FRC’s issuance has declined 
at the time of its writing, Singh (2005) notes that there is still a significant amount of FRCs being 
issued. This observation either can be indicative of the financing of last resort motivation functioning 
or a continued slowness of financial managers to recognize the faulty design features of FRCs. 
According to Placement Tracker, there were 121 FRC deals in 2004. While less than a third of issues 
made in 2000, this is still a significant amount of deals, amounting to $628 million ($3.2 billion in 
2000). Though, Singh does find that more recently issued FRCs have terms that reduce the problems 
that these FRCs have had in the past. Examples of terms that can control the price manipulation of 
the stock of FRC issuers are (1) direct restriction on the investor from short selling, (2) floors on the 
conversion price, (3) restriction on the number of shares convertible at one time, (4) reduced 
discounts relative to the reference price, and (5) investigating whether the investor has engaged in 
price manipulation in the past. The change in these terms, therefore, would support the view that 
these contracts were faulty and have merited being altered. However, not all issues involve these 
controls. Singh concludes,  
“toxic convertibles represent a financial innovation that, through an 
iterative and – unfortunately, for any investors – costly process, has 
improved its design but is still used by the same types of firms as in 
the past….The rationale for use of toxics appears to be driven by 
despair, ignorance, or both. However, with improvements in contract 
design, as outlined earlier, smaller firms in need of capital that 
cannot access the market for traditional securities are better 
positioned to consider these securities”  
 
The existence of research that cautions against the use of FRCs raises the question of why some 
firms issue them and why others avoid them.  The implication of the FCD hypothesis is that the 
financial management of the issuers do not understand them. While there is a large literature on the 
impact of the chief executive officer on the decisions and performance of the firm, there is an 
emerging literature on the impact of the chief financial officer. CFOs do influence the performance of 
firms as evidenced by their removal following poor performance in Mian (2001). The disciplinary 
removal of CFOs is robust to decision to retain or remove the CEO. Chava and Purnanandam (2007) 
show that the incentives of the CFO, not the CEO, affect the firm’s choice of floating rate versus 
fixed rate straight debt. Brettel et. al. (2008) test Hackbarth (2004)’s model of firm leverage and 
CFO. They find that firms with “overconfident” CFOs tend to have higher leverage.  
 
While the above papers consider the interaction among firm performance, CFO actions, and CFO 
incentives, the only area of research regarding direct measures of financial manager skill that the 
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author is aware of is in the mutual fund literature. Numerous studies document that mutual fund 
managers differ in their stock picking skills (Wermers, 2000; Chen, et. al., 2001; Baker, et. al., 2005; 
and Harlow and Brown, 2007).  
 
In a study of active fund managers, MBA school quality is positively and significantly related to fund 
performance over 2000-2003 (Gottesman and Morey, 2006). This effect is particularly strong among 
the top business schools, as ranked by Business Week.   Other studies find a significance of the 
undergraduate program from which the manager graduated (Chevalier and Ellison, 1999). 
Furthermore, other certifications or degrees such as a CFA, other masters degrees, or Ph.Ds does not 
appear to correlate with fund performance.  
 
There also has been recent research regarding the financial connection and expertise of the board of 
directors. Mitchell and Walker (2008) find that firms that are large and less likely to be in financial 
distress are more likely to have commercial bankers on their boards. Also, firms that have higher 
leverage, less market value of equity, and high investment / low Tobin’s q or low investment / high 
Tobin’s q are more likely to have bankers as directors. Becker-Blease and Grein (2008) argue that 
the advisory role of the board of directors needs to be considered in addition to the monitoring role.  
 
III. Data Sample  
A. Sources  
All FRC deals made in 2001 and 2002 are considered. Deal data come from PrivateRaise. Stock 
return and delisting information for each issuer come from CRSP, and financial statement data from 
Compustat. Analyst coverage data come from I/B/E/S. CFO, CEO, and director data are hand 
collected primarily from Edgar filings (10K’s, 10Q’s, and proxy statements mostly). Lexis Nexis and 
online business press articles are used where Edgar and the companies web sites do not provide the 
information.  
 
B. Pre-Issue Firm Characteristics  
1. FRC Issuers  
I identify the CFO characteristics of 61 firms issuing FRCs in 2001 and 2002. I am able to identify 
the CFO characteristics of 43 firms that issued FRCs over the same period. Issuing firms tend have 
small size, high growth opportunities, low leverage, high investment, operating losses, and high 
propensity to be in bankruptcy (median Ohlson score of 0.88).   See Table 1. 
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Table 1 
Pre-Issue Firm Financial Characteristics 
This table displays summary statistics of characteristics of FRC issuers and three groups of control firms, fixed price PIPE issuers, SEO issuers, 
and match non-equity issuers measured in the year prior to the firms making these issues.  (In the case of match non-issuers, FRC issuance 
dates are imputed to them.)  COVERED is an indicator that equals 1 if at least one stock analyst made a forecast for the firm.  CFVOL is the 
cash flow volatility, defined as the standard deviation of operating income up to twenty fiscal quarters before the announcement date.  OSCORE 
is the probability of becoming financially distressed defined by Ohlson (1980).  FIRMVALUE is log of the market value of equity plus book 
values of preferred and total debt.  TOBINQ is the market value of the firm divided by the book value of the assets. LEVERAGE is the the long 
term debt divided by the book value of assets.  INVESTMENT is the total of R&D and advertising divided by the lagged property, plant, and 
equipment.  PROFITABILITY is the operating cash flow before depreciation divided by lagged assets.  FRC issuers’ variables’ means are 
significantly different from the fixed price PIPE issuers, SEO issuers, non-equity-issuers if denoted by an a, b, or c, respectively, at the 5% level. 
 












N 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 
Median 1.000 5.793 0.879 4.410 0.054 0.087 0.780 -0.192 
Mean 0.581b 20.193 0.753 b 4.726b 0.180ab 0.470 2.563 -0.346bc 
Standard Error 0.076 7.507 0.042 0.225 0.051 0.212 0.656 0.093 
 
Panel B:   Fixed Price PIPE Issuers 
 Variable 








N 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Median 1.000 4.431 0.794 4.440 0.100 0.002 0.905 -0.139 
Mean 0.600 10.784 0.715 4.245 0.135 0.100 2.942 -0.620 
Standard Error 0.078 3.385 0.047 0.209 0.023 0.037 0.845 0.320 
 
Panel C:   SEO Issuers 
 Variable 








N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
Median 1.000 18.352 0.530 6.792 0.015 0.555 0.076 0.150 
Mean 0.934 25.127 0.529 6.693 0.030 0.562 1.787 -0.060 
Standard Error 0.036 3.747 0.039 0.150 0.006 0.084 0.618 0.097 
 
Panel D:   Non-Issuers 
 Variable 








N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Median 1.000 14.222 0.870 5.047 0.035 0.022 0.183 -0.043 
Mean 0.736 23.562 0.696 5.108 0.072 0.202 1.730 -0.057 
Standard Error 0.072 4.221 0.053 0.308 0.018 0.043 0.624 0.043 
 
The sample of FRC issuers tend to be in the information technology or pharmaceutical industries. 
Using the 48 industry Fama-French industry definitions, the most represented industries among the 
43 FRC issuing firms are “Business Services” (ten), “Drugs” (five), “Medical Equipment” (four), and 
“Telecommunications” (four). 
 
Only half of the firms have at least one analyst covering them in the year prior to issue.   Therefore, I 
mostly measure the degree of information asymmetry by using a dummy variable that equals one if 
the firm has at least one analyst covering it in the prior year and zero otherwise. Among the 19 
issuers that do have analyst coverage, the median earnings surprise is 30.80 percent.  Among 
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analysts covering the same firm, the median standard deviation in estimates of earnings is 16.76 
percent.  See Table 2. 
Table 2 
Pre-Issue Analyst Coverage Characteristics  
This table displays summary statistics of analyst forecasts of FRC issuers and the three control group firms (fixed price PIPE 
issuers, SEO issuers, and match non-equity-issuing firms).  The mean surprise is the absolute percent difference in actual 
earnings from forecasted earnings over the year.  Dispersion is the standard deviation of forecasts among analysts.  Maximum 
# of Analyst Coverage is the maximum number of analysts covering the firm at the same quarter.  FRC issuers’ variables’ 
means are significantly different from the fixed price PIPE issuers, SEO issuers, non-equity-issuers if denoted by an a, b, or c, 
respectively, at the 5% level. 
 
Panel A:   FRC Issuers 
 Variables 
Statistics Mean Surprise Dispersion Maximum # Analyst 
Coverage 
N 19 19 22 
Median 0.308 0.005 4.500 
Mean 0.396 10.103 5.727b 
Standard Error 0.065 9.472 0.947 
 
Panel B:   Fixed Price PIPE Issuers 
 Variables 
Statistics Mean Surprise Dispersion Maximum # Analyst 
Coverage 
N 21 20 21 
Median 0.302 0.059 4.000 
Mean 0.709 1.041 6.761 
Standard Error 0.234 0.895 1.305 
 
Panel C:   SEO Issuers 
 Variables 
Statistics Mean Surprise Dispersion Maximum # Analyst 
Coverage 
N 45 45 45 
Median 0.082 0.049 9.000 
Mean 0.291 0.109 10.933 
Standard Error 0.107 0.032 1.328 
 
Panel D:   Matched Non-Equity-Issuers 
 Variables 
Statistics Mean Surprise Dispersion Maximum # Analyst 
Coverage 
N 21 18 21 
Median 0.230 0.047 5.000 
Mean 0.353 0.090 10.761 
Standard Error 0.073 0.030 3.110 
 
These firm characteristics are consistent with prior studies of FRC issues and with the theory that 
firms with severe information asymmetries and risk can use privately placed equity to find financing 
at a low enough cost. Furthermore, the structured nature of FRCs indicates that investors have 
concerns that the values of the firms’ stock will drop. The apparent decline in number of FRC deals 
from 2001 to 2002 may also reflect the disproportionate reluctance of investing in such firms as the 
stock market continued to cool.  
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2. Control Firm Identification  
Finding the benchmark for these firms is a challenging task that some previous studies deal with. 
Hillion and Vermaelen (2004) compare issuing firms to matched nonissuing firms using a propensity 
to issue matching algorithm wherein they create a probit model for propensity to issue a FRC 
(Dehejia and Wahba, 1998).   They match every issuer with a nonissuer that has the closest 
propensity of issuing a FRC.  
 
Their probit model uses operating return on assets, profit margin, ROA, operating income / sales, 
(capitalization expenditures + R&D) / assets, and market to book value of equity.  I use the same or 
similar predictors plus a measure for financial distress.  I include the Ohlson financial distress 
variable (“O-score”, or OSCORE) (Ohlson, 1980) because I am considering a very special segment of 
stocks that are characterized by being in extreme financial distress (Chaplinsky and Haushalter, 
2003). These firms are likely to “go dark,” i.e. cease trading on NYSE or Nasdaq, which may occur 
because their stock price falls below the minimum levels allowed by the exchanges (Leuz, Triantis, 
and Wang, 2006). Furthermore, the financing of last resort hypothesis states that it is precisely the 
firms that are in financial distress that would issue a FRC.  
 
In addition to OSCORE, I borrow variables used by Gomes and Phillips (2005) in their study of 
public versus private security issuance choice.  To measure risk, they use cash flow volatility 
(CFVOL), defined as the  standard deviation of operating income before depreciation (Compustat 
item data13) up to twenty fiscal quarters before the announcement date. To measure information 
asymmetry, they use the mean earnings surprise and dispersion of analyst earnings estimates 
discussed previously. Because half the sample of firms issuing FRCs do not having any analyst 
coverage, I cannot use these variables without losing half the sample of firms, leaving only 19. 
Therefore, I use a dummy variable, COVERED, that equals one if the firm is covered by at least one 
analyst in at least one quarter prior to the issue, and zero otherwise. In addition to measures for risk 
and information asymmetry, Gomes and Phillips (2005) use log of firm value, Tobin’s q, leverage, 
investment in R&D, and profitability as controls. The log of firm value (FIRMVALUE) is defined by 
the market value of equity plus book values of preferred and total debt (in Compustat: 
data24*data25 + data9 + data34 + data39).   Tobin’s q (TOBINQ) is defined by the market value of 
the firm divided by the book value of the assets (exp(FIRMVALUE) / data6). The debt to asset ratio 
(LEVERAGE) is defined by the long term debt divided by the book value of assets (data9t / data6t-1). 
Research and development (INVESTMENT) is defined by the total of R&D and advertising divided 
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by the lagged property, plant, and equipment (data45t+data46t)/data8t-1. PROFITABILITY is defined 
by the operating cash flow before depreciation divided lagged assets (data13t/data6t-1). 1
 
 
I regress the qualitative variable that equals one if a firm issues a PIPE of any kind and zero if it 
does not on these variables with clustered standard errors by Fama-French 48 industry 
classification. The regression model has an explanatory power of 9.86 percent. Consistent with 
previous research, firms that issue PIPEs are more likely to be in financial distress and high R&D 
expenditure (all significant at the 5% or greater levels.)  See Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
Propensity to Issue a PIPE Logit Regression 
Below are logit model estimates of the likelihood that a firm issues a PIPE.  The standard errors are clustered by the Fama-
French 48 industry classification.  COVERED is an indicator that equals 1 if at least one stock analyst made a forecast for the 
firm.  CFVOL is the cash flow volatility, defined as the standard deviation of operating income up to twenty fiscal quarters 
before the announcement date.  OSCORE is the probability of becoming financially distressed defined by Ohlson (1980).  
FIRMVALUE is log of the market value of equity plus book values of preferred and total debt.  TOBINQ is the market value of 
the firm divided by the book value of the assets. LEVERAGE is the the long term debt divided by the book value of assets.  
INVESTMENT is the total of R&D and advertising divided by the lagged property, plant, and equipment.  PROFITABILITY 
is the operating cash flow before depreciation divided lagged assets.  Estimates are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels if 
denoted with *, **, or *** respectively. 
 
Variable Coefficient Estimate Robust Standard Error 
COVERED 0.697*** 0.132 
CFVOL -0.004 0.002 
OSCORE 2.544*** 0.206 
FIRMVALUE 0.094* 0.051 
TOBINQ -0.017** 0.008 
LEVERAGE -0.106* 0.061 
INVESTMENT 0.006*** 0.002 
PROFITABILITY -0.027* 0.014 
CONSTANT -5.056*** 0.302 
   
N 10509  
PSEUDO R-SQUARED 0.098  
 
Firms that are covered by at least one stock analyst are actually more likely to issue PIPEs. If 
COVERED represents information asymmetry, then such a result is not expected if the regression 
were conditional on issuing some type of equity security. However, the regression is based on all 
firms in the Compustat universe in 2001 and 2002. Therefore, firms that are not covered by an 
analyst at all, ceteris paribus, are less likely to issue a PIPE (and in all probability, a SEO as well). 
If COVERED represents the costs to issuing equity publicly, then the fact that PIPE issuers are 
likely to be covered by an analyst already may indicate that private costs borne by the managers of 
the firm may be taken into consideration when making the issuance decision.  Variables that are 
weakly significant in the propensity equation are FIRMVALUE (positive sign), LEVERAGE 
(negative sign), and PROFITABILITY (negative sign).    
1 Gomes and Phillips (2005) use an alternative measure for financial distress, ALTMAN, a dummy variable that equals one if 
the firm’s Altman z-score is less than 1.81 (Altman, 2000). I also compute a propensity model using ALTMAN, and do not find 




Using the propensity scores computed on the universe of non-structured PIPE issuers, defined by 
PIPEs that do not have downward price protections (“Fixed PIPEs”), SEO issuers (“SEOs”), and non-
equity matched issuers (“Non-Issuers”), I match the firms from each control group that have the 
closest propensity score (PROPENSITY) to each FRC issuer.  
 
Because the Non-Issuer control group has no issue date, for the purpose of the event study, I impute 
an event date to each Non-Issuer equivalent to the announcement date of a FRC issue of the firm 
with the closest propensity score.  
 
C. Deal Characteristics  
1. FRC Deals  
The median FRC deal is for $4.0 million and 12.1 percent of the issuing firm’s market capitalization.  
 
Table 4 
PIPE Deal Characteristics 





PIPE   FRC 
Fixed 
PIPE 
Security Type    Conversion Restriction   
Common Stock 6 25  No 19 11 
Convertible Debt 22 9  Unknown 14 25 
Convertible Preferred 
Stock 
15 6  Yes 10 4 
       
Conversion Type    Selling Restriction   
Fixed 0 40  No 27 26 
Reset 22 0  Unknown 14 12 
Variable 23 0  Yes 2 2 
       
Warrants Included    Hedge Restriction   
No 15 23  No 23 25 
Yes 28 17  Unknown 13 13 
    Yes 7 2 
       
Antidilution Clause    Forced Conversion   
No 15 19  No 14 7 
Unknown 12 11  Unknown 15 27 
Yes 16 10  Yes 14 6 
       
Hard Floor Price    Investor Purchase 
Rights 
  
No 21 40  No 20 22 
Unknown 7 0  Unknown 14 12 
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Yes 15 0  Yes 9 6 
       
Soft Floor Price    Mandatory Registration   
No 33 40  No 6 8 
Unknown 7 0  Unknown 4 10 
Yes 3 0  Yes 33 22 
 
There is a wide range of deal sizes from $1.0 million to $1.5 billion, and percentages of market 
capitalization from 1.7 percent to 108.8 percent. The median conversion price is calculated at 100.0 
percent of the reference stock price, with the lowest conversion price being 50 percent and the 
highest being 242 percent. These deal characteristics are consistent with previous research finding 
that these deals are made at discounts and of significant sizes. See Table 5.  
 
Of the 43 deals, a significant number have at least one term that provides some type of limit on how 
much investors can profit from stock price declines. See Table 4. Eighteen deals impose floors on the 
conversion prices, and 10 deals restrict the amount of converting at one time. Two deals restrict 
short selling, and seven restrict hedging by the investors, thus limiting their ability and incentive to 
exert selling pressure on the issuers’ stocks. Ten of the deals have forced conversion provisions, 
which would force the investors to convert their securities under certain circumstances; this 
provision enables the firm to take advantage of a rising stock price by selling shares at the future 
high market price.  
 
Sixteen deals have anti-dilution clauses, which provide more shares to the investor if the firm issues 
more shares in the future, so as to protect the investor from diluted value of shares. Thirty-three of 
the deals include mandatory registration rights of the stock underlying the FRCs, making the 
investors able to sell the shares that they convert. Nine of the deals have investor purchase rights,  
which gives the investor in the FRC the right of first refusal when the firm attempts to issue future 
securities; thus, firms that issue these rights would be limited in its future financing options.  
 
Twenty-eight deals include warrants, which tend to have high exercise prices; median exercise price 
is at a premium of 16 percent over the market price at issuance (See Table 5). Inclusion of warrants 
at premiums may offset the interest the investors have in stock price declines. These warrants 
represent sizable stakes in the warrant issuers, ranging from 4.4 percent to 150.0 percent of 
outstanding shares with a median of 33.3 percent.  
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2. Fixed-Price PIPE Deals  
The deal sizes of the fixed PIPE issues of the control group are similar to those of the FRC issues.  
The median deal size is $6.5 million and 16.0 percent of market capitalization. The median PIPE 
price is 97.0 percent of the market stock price.  
 
Fixed price PIPEs do not have the features that pressure the stock prices down as do FRCs.  
Therefore, the net benefits of including specific terms differ between the two types of issuances. 
Fixed price PIPE issuers are less likely to include conversion restrictions (4 out of 40 deals) and less 
likely to include hedge restrictions (2 out of 40), indicating that some issuers who choose to issue 
FRCs over fixed price PIPEs negotiate terms that are particularly important to moderating the 
impact of the FRC. However, other terms are equally present in the two types of deals: short-selling 
restrictions and forced conversion clauses.  
 
The fraction of deals with pro-investor terms is higher among FRC issues than fixed price PIPE 
issues. Fixed price PIPE deals are less likely to have anti-dilution clauses (10 out of 40 deals) and 
less likely to have registration rights (22 out of 40 deals). This pattern is contrary to that of the 
greater prevalence of pro-issuer rights among FRC deals than fixed PIPE deals. Perhaps the 
investors in FRCs demand that they be protected from the higher likelihood that the firm will need 
to raise more capital in the future via anti-dilution clauses and from the likelihood that the investor 
will be unable to sell its shares if it waits too long to seek to have them registered.  
 
Fixed PIPE issuers are also less likely to include warrants. Only 17 out of the 40 fixed price PIPE 
deals include warrants.  The lower rate of inclusion of warrants among fixed price PIPE issuers may 
indicate the lesser need to provide rewards to the investor for upward movements in the stock price. 
The fixed price PIPE deals’ median warrant premium, 6.0 percent, and median warrant coverage 
amount, 50.0 percent, are comparable to the FRC issues.  
 
3. SEO Deals  
The size of SEO deals in comparison to the FRC deals is greater in absolute dollars but similar in 
percent or market capitalization. The median SEO amount is $114.5 million, and the median deal 
amount as percent of market capitalization is 16.8 percent. The median SEO price is 95.9 percent of 




The pricing and quantity of deals among the FRC, fixed price PIPE, and SEO issuers are given below.  The deal amount / 
market cap is the amount raised divided by the market value of the stock at the time of issuance.  The premium is the 
percentage of the reference stock price.  The warrant premium is in term of the stock price at the time of issuance.  The 
warrant coverage is the number of shares underlying the warrants as a percent of outstanding shares.  FRC issuers’ variables’ 
means are significantly different from the fixed price PIPE issuers, SEO issuers, non-equity-issuers if denoted by an a, b, or c, 
respectively, at the 5% level. 
 
Panel A:  FRCs 
 
Statistics Deal Amount 
($000) 
Deal Amount / 
Market Cap (%) 




N 43 43 43 28 27 
Median 4.000 12.100 100.000 115.500 33.300 
Mean 45.518b 21.041 103.504 117.642 49.644 
Standard Error 34.694 4.035 5.554 8.740 7.447 
Panel B:  Fixed Price PIPEs 
 
Statistics Deal Amount 
($000) 
Deal Amount / 
Market Cap (%) 




N 40 40 40 17 17 
Median 6.500 16.000 97.000 106.000 50.000 
Mean 10.047 21.707 99.017 112.970 64.635 
Standard Error 1.611 4.136 5.610 5.603 11.384 
Panel C:  SEOs 
 
Statistics Deal Amount 
($000) 
Deal Amount / 
Market Cap (%) 
Premium (%) 
N 46 44 44 
Median 114.550 16.760 95.893 
Mean 171.258 36.238 101.490 
Standard Error 33.836 11.037 4.294 
 
D. CFO and Other Management Characteristics  
CFO Characteristics. The median age of the CFOs of FRC issuers is 43.5 years. The median amount 
that CFOs own of the firm is 1.0 percent. Fifty-one percent of CFOs have experience as a CFO, 
treasurer, or comptroller of another public firm.  However, only 27 percent were financial officers at 
public firms when those firms issued either IPOs or SEOs. Among the more limited number of FRC 
issuers for which I could find educational data, 42 percent have CFOs who have MBAs. CFOs of FRC 
issuers are less likely to have been at the firm when it went public than the control firms.  See Table 
6.   
 
In addition to the CFO variables in Table 6, the tenure of the CFO at her firm is collected.  Only two 
of the CFOs of FRC issuers were at their firms when they made their initial public offerings.  
However eight fixed price PIPE issuers, seven SEO issuers, and four non-equity issuers have CFOs 
at the time of issue who also were CFOs at the time of IPO.  See the Appendix for the biographical 
information provided by firms on their CFOs, organized by CFO public equity experience. 
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Boards of Directors. The median board size of FRC issuers is six. The median percent of board 
members who are also employees of the firm (“insiders”) is 33.33. The median percent of board 
members who are financial professionals is 16.67.  Financial professional is defined as being an 
employee of a financial institution, such as an investment bank or hedge fund, or being a financial 
officer, such as a CFO, of another firm. The median of the mean age of the firms’ directors is 54.8 
years. The median ownership of the firm by all directors and managers is 18.1 percent.  See Table 6 




The descriptive statistics of the CEOs, CFOs, and boards of directors of the FRC issuers and control firms are shown the 
following panels. These values are collected in the period prior to the security issuances, or imputed issuances in the case of 
the matched non-equity-issuers.  CFO / CEO Comp is the fraction of CFO cash compensation to CEO cash compensation.  % 
Board Insiders is the percent of board members who are also managers of the same firms.  % Board Financial Experts is the 
percent of board members who are either employed by a financial institution or is a CFO.  FRC issuers’ variables’ means are 
significantly different from the fixed price PIPE issuers, SEO issuers, non-equity-issuers if denoted by an a, b, or c, 
respectively, at the 5% level. 
 
Panel A:  FRC Issuers 
Variable N Median Mean 
Standard 
Error 
CFO with Prior Public Firm Experience 53 1 0.547b 0.069 
CFO with Public Equity Offering Experience 54 0 0.203 b 0.055 
Total Director and Management Ownership 51 18.100 24.306 b 2.571 
CFO/CEO Comp 44 0.622 0.692 b 0.051 
% Board Insiders 51 0.333 0.390 ab 0.041 
% Board Financial Experts 51 0.166 0.217 0.032 
Avg. Board Age 51 54.80000 53.649 0.891 
CFO with MBA 57 0.000 0.421a 0.065 
CFO with Unknown Education 57 0.000 0.175 abc 0.050 
CFO Ownership 47 0.010 0.020 b 0.005 
CEO Ownership 51 4.4000 9.447 ac 1.939 
CEO Compensation 50 325072 611264 236765 
CFO Compensation 45 199615 229416 b 19358 
CFO Age 36 43.500 42.250 b 1.257 
Board Size 38 6.000 6.289 0.330 
 
 
Panel B:  Fixed Price PIPE Issuers 
Variable N Median Mean 
Standard 
Error 
CFO with Prior Public Firm Experience 40 0.000 0.425 0.079 
CFO with Public Equity Offering Experience 40 0.000 0.325 0.075 
Total Director and Management Ownership 42 13.910 21.130 2.906 
CFO/CEO Comp 41 0.606 1.978 1.323 
% Board Insiders 43 0.250 0.294 0.024 
% Board Financial Experts 43 0.222 0.271 0.030 
Avg. Board Age 43 54.500 53.820 0.732 
CFO with MBA 47 0.000 0.234 0.062 
CFO with Unknown Education 47 0.000 0.489 0.073 
CFO Ownership 42 0.010 0.012 0.003 
CEO Ownership 42 0.0272 0.0626 0.016 
CEO Compensation 43 310000 365279 49104 
CFO Compensation 42 200053 210114 17327 
CFO Age 34 42.500 43.882 1.452 
Board Size 36 6.000 6.222 0.314 
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Panel C:  SEO Issuers 
Variable N Median Mean 
Standard 
Error 
CFO with Prior Public Firm Experience 41 1.000 0.804 0.062 
CFO with Public Equity Offering Experience 41 1.000 0.951 0.034 
Total Director and Management Ownership 40 7.850 16.052 3.024 
CFO/CEO Comp 41 0.409 0.502 0.041 
% Board Insiders 39 0.285 0.290 0.024 
% Board Financial Experts 39 0.200 0.215 0.025 
Avg. Board Age 38 55.160 55.832 0.949 
CFO with MBA 47 0.000 0.361 0.070 
CFO with Unknown Education 47 0.000 0.468 0.073 
CFO Ownership 40 1.000 0.985 0.027 
CEO Ownership 40 2.045 5.352 1.617 
CEO Compensation 41 806077 1033665 120987 
CFO Compensation 41 357180 389269 27236 
CFO Age 44 45.000 45.750 1.112 
Board Size 36 7.000 7.194 0.313 
 
Panel D:  Non-Issuers 
Variable N Median Mean 
Standard 
Error 
CFO with Prior Public Firm Experience 39 0.000 0.435 0.080 
CFO with Public Equity Offering Experience 39 0.000 0.282 0.073 
Total Director and Management Ownership 39 21.400 25.801 3.421 
CFO/CEO Comp 38 0.586 0.660 0.074 
% Board Insiders 39 0.333 0.366 0.039 
% Board Financial Experts 39 0.250 0.270 0.031 
Avg. Board Age 39 53.571 52.761 0.992 
CFO with MBA 47 0.000 0.319 0.068 
CFO with Unknown Education 47 1.000 0.510 0.073 
CFO Ownership 39 0.010 0.013 0.001 
CEO Ownership 40 0.023 0.071 0.014 
CEO Compensation 39 399250 547564 69821 
CFO Compensation 39 206153 296634 52068 
CFO Age 32 45.000 44.750 1.448 
Board Size 31 7.000 7.129 0.421 
 
PIPE Investor Identity.  Investors in FRCs are unlikely to be firm managers.  Only two FRC issues 
are purchased by management, whereas eight fixed price PIPE issues were purchased by 
management.  FRC and fixed price PIPE issues are made to investors who hold seats on the issuers’ 
boards at a rate less than ten percent.  Four FRC issuers and six fixed price PIPE issuers sold PIPEs 
to institutions with board seats. 
 
E. Announcement Cumulative Abnormal Returns  
A Fama-French three-factor plus momentum model was built to calculate abnormal returns.  The 
CARs are also robust to alternative market models: the capital asset pricing model and the Fama-
French three factor model.  The coefficients for each model are determined using a 250 market day 
window prior to three months prior before the announcement dates. Table 7 presents the cumulative 





Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Firm Group 
Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated five days prior through five days after the issuance announcement (imputed 
announcement in the case of the matched non-equity-issuers).  The abnormal return is computed by using a four factor 
market model:  the excess market, small minus big portfolio, high minus low market to book portfolio, and the winners minus 
losers momentum portfolio.  The coefficients on each of these are calculated over the 250 market day period a month prior to 




ncy Minimum Median Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Error 
FRC Issuer 41 -0.387 -0.040 0.682 -0.011 0.035 
Fixed Price PIPE Issuer 34 -0.421 0.004 2.339 0.152* 0.083 
SEO Issuer 35 -0.188 0.024 0.889 0.063 0.030 
Non-Equity Issuer 31 -0.301 0.016 0.473 0.028 0.030 
Total 141 -0.421 0.013 2.339 0.055** 0.024 
 
F. Post-Issue Firm Characteristics  
In the year of the FRC issuance, the only financial ratios presented in Table I that significantly 
change is financial distress (OSCORE) and the value of the firm (FIRMVALUE). The mean 
probability of financial distress increases 13.01 percent and the mean firms’ value decreases by $0.50 
million, both with significances greater than the one percent level. From the year of issue to the 
following year, neither the level of financial distress nor firm value change. However, from the year 
of the issue to the following year, Tobin’s q increases by eight percent and R&D drops by 64 percent, 
both at the five percent level of significance.  These patterns are also robust to industry adjustments.  
These changes in operating performance over the period of a year prior to the year of issue are only 
found in the group of FRC issuers. SEO issuers and non-equity issuers experience significant drops 
in the probability of financial distress (SEO: -10.1 percent; Non-Issuers: -12.2 percent). SEO issuers’ 
value significantly increases by 23.2 percent, and their leverage significantly decreases by 16.4 
percent. Fixed price PIPE issuers and non-equity-issuers decrease their levels of R&D investment 
(Fixed PIPE: -127.6 percent; Non-Issuers: -51.2 percent). Among the control groups, there is little 
change from the year of issue to the following year. Fixed price PIPE issuers are more likely to be in 
financial distress by a mean of 10.5 percent. Non-equity issuers’ profits increase by a mean of 6.7 
percent. 
 
While the level of R&D investment does not decrease significantly from the year prior to and year of 
issue among FRC issuers, the fixed PIPE issuers and non-equity-issuers have significant decreases 
in R&D. However, in the year following issue, only FRC issuers significantly reduce R&D 
investment. This finding is consistent with Hillion and Vermaelen (2004)’s, who interpret the 
relative initial run up in R&D and subsequent decline in R&D as a pre-issue confidence by issuing 
management in future returns to their investment.  
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Of the 43 FRC issuers, ten are delisted and one is acquired within one year following the issuance. 
However, only two of the 40 fixed-price-PIPE issuers are delisted and three are acquired in one year 
following the announcement. None of the 46 SEO issuers are delisted and one is acquired. The only 
control group that has a similar number of delistings to the FRC issuer group is 38 non-equity 
issuers, of which seven are delisted.  
 
The similarity between FRCs and non-issuers in terms of delisting rates indicates that the issuance 
of a FRC does not increase its chances of remaining in business (or, is predictive of being able to stay 
in business). On the other hand, fixed PIPE issuers and SEO issuers have a greater chance of 
remaining in business and being acquired than FRC issuers and non-equity issuers.  This pattern 
does not support the FLR hypothesis. 
 
IV. Hypotheses 
Hypotheses concerning the rationale for the existence of FRCs are presented in Hillion and 
Vermaelen  (2004):  the undervaluation, faulty contract design, and financing of last resort 
hypotheses.  Two of these, the FCD and FLR hypotheses are not rejected by the authors, and they 
are two explanations that are commonly accepted today for the existence of FRCs.  Either of the two 
hypotheses place FRCs in a negative light.  In the case of the FCD hypothesis, the FRC is an 
instrument of predation by unscrupulous investors who take advantage of firms whose management 
is either ignorant or in collusion with the investors.  In the case of the FLR hypothesis, the FRC is 
the only source of continued financing for firms that would otherwise have to cease operations. 
 
While the latter hypothesis offers a rational explanation for the existence of FRCs, it does not offer a 
more positive explanation than that they are cheap enough for investors so that they will be willing 
to purchase them.  Why, however, is the floating conversion feature included rather than a more 
deeply discounted fixed conversion price?  The FLR hypothesis does not provide an answer. 
 
Additional explanations appeal to fundamental concepts in corporate finance.  FRCs may exist to 
resolve problems that reduce firm value, which may be explained by an “optimal security design” 
(OSD) hypothesis.  Two possible examples of the OSD hypothesis are (i) the tradeoff between the 
debt tax shield and financial distress and (ii) the problem of debt overhang:   
 
(i) Trade-Off:  A firm determines an optimal leverage by maximizing the net benefit of the 
debt tax shield minus bankruptcy costs.  The costs of bankruptcy are higher with the 
likelihood of default.  If the market value of the stock falls after the issuance of debt and 
equity securities, the tax shield benefits decrease due to lower likelihood of having any 
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positive pre-tax income before interest payments for the coming years and the 
bankruptcy costs increase due to higher likelihood of bankruptcy.  The FRC causes the 
investors to change the debt-equity ratio in this scenario without the firm having to 
negotiate with bondholders. 
 
(ii) Debt Overhang:  A firm issues preferred stock or debt.  After issuance, the real option 
value of its growth prospects decrease.  This is reflected in a declining stock price.   If the 
capital structure remains the same, the management, acting in the interest of the 
common equity holders, does not take positive NPV projects because of the overhang 
from debt or required dividends (Myers 1977).  To avoid the renegotiation costs of 
exchanging the preferred stock or debt for common stock, the firm issues a FRC so that 
when the real option value goes down, the FRC is automatically converted into common 
shares because it is in the interest of the FRC investors.   
 
The hypotheses that this study tests are the FCD, FLR, and OSD hypotheses.  The FLR hypothesis 
and OSD hypotheses are similar in that they provide a rationale for FRCs that does not depend on 
behavioral arguments.  They differ in that the FLR hypothesis basically says that FRCs are issued 
because they are cheap for the investor, but the OSD hypothesis provides rationales specifically for 
the floating conversion price feature.  Because this study’s purview is empirical and the OSD 
hypothesis is only introduced here, I only test the OSD hypothesis in the broad sense.  Testing the 
specific manifestations of the OSD hypothesis is reserved for future research. 
 
All firms do not necessarily issue FRCs for the same cause.  Some firms may be unwitting victims of 
exploitive investors who intend to manipulate the stock price downward in order to expropriate a 
larger portion of the firm’s equity.  Many firms could be fully aware of the costs of FRC issuance and 
make the decision to issue the FRC wisely.  Therefore, the empirical tests of this study do not seek to 
accept one hypothesis as true for all firms and reject other hypotheses.  Rather, the tests are 
designed to test whether certain characteristics of firms’ management can be linked to the various 
explanations for FRC issuances. 
 
 
The group of FRC issuing firms is compared to the three control groups: fixed price PIPE issuers, 
SEO issuers, and no- equity issuing matched firms. Abnormal announcement returns are based on 
the Fama French three-factor plus momentum model and are computed using the 250 market day 
window prior to the month of issuance. The control groups are determined by using a score 
measuring the propensity to issue a PIPE. The non-equity-issuing matched firms are imputed with 
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event dates the same as the FRC issuing firm with the closest propensity scores.  Managerial 
characteristics of FRC issuers relative to the control firms are related to the following three areas:  
propensity to issue FRCs, stock market FRC announcement reaction, and long-term stock 
performance of FRC issuers.   
 
In the first area, multinomial logit regression of the issuance type among the control groups is run 
on managerial characteristics.  Significant coefficients on sophistication and/or incentives provide 
support to the FCD hypothesis and lack of support to the FLR and OSD hypotheses.  If less 
sophistication, greater conflicts of interest, and less monitoring of financial managers correlate with 
greater likelihood of issuing a FRC, then the FCD hypothesis is supported.  The FLR and OSD 
hypotheses would not necessarily be refuted because it would be possible for certain FRC issuers to 
issue FRCs that benefit their firms if they have CFOs who have above average sophistication than 
the entire sample of FRC issuers. 
 
 In the second area, the stock market cumulative abnormal return is regressed on the managerial 
characteristics.  If the market reacts negatively to firms issuing FRCs with unsophisticated or 
conflicted management, then the FCD hypothesis may be true for those firms.  In addition, I would 
interpret such a relationship to support the OSD hypothesis because the market only would be 
reacting negatively  when the FRC is issued to the determinant of existing shareholders.  I would not 
interpret such a finding to support the FLR hypothesis, however, because if the market differentiates 
FRC issues by managerial characteristics, then it should also be able to interpret the issuance as a 
negative signal immediately upon announcement rather than over a long period of time after 
issuance. 
 
In the third area, calendar time alphas of a portfolio long on experienced and short on inexperienced 
FRC issuers is computed.  If this portfolio is positive, then this supports the FCD and OSD 
hypotheses.  I would conclude that a non-equity-value maximizing choice was made where the firm 
management is less experienced.  On the other hand, among the firms where the firm management 
is experienced, I would conclude that the FRC was issued to maximize existing shareholder value if 
no long run abnormal returns are detected among these same firms.  I would reject the FLR 
hypothesis if only the FRC issuers with inexperienced CFOs have negative long run returns because 
the FLR hypothesis predicts that all FRC issuers experience negative long run returns. 
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V. Results  
A. Relationship of Managerial Characteristics on Issuance Choice  
Unconditional Mean Comparison of Firm Managements. If FRCs are issued because they are faulty 
contracts rather than financings of last resort, then the firms that issue FRCs are less financially 
savvy than similar firms. Or, their management has conflicts of interest whereby they have interests 
with the FRC investors.  I show that firms with CFOs who have had experience placing equity 
publicly and those with boards that are less composed of insiders are less likely to issue FRCs.  
 
The unconditional means between the two groups show that 85.85 percent of the non-FRC issuing 
firms have CFOs who are the CFO, treasurer, or comptroller over a firm when it makes either an 
IPO or SEO.  On the other hand, only 27.91 percent of the FRC issuing firms had CFOs with such 
experience. This is statistically significant at the five percent level.  (Compare Panel A with the other 
panels of Table 6.)  This difference in groups that are otherwise just as likely to issue a PIPE 
suggests that the CFOs’ experience issuing public equity predicts which kind of security is issued. 
This result supports the argument underlying the FCD hypothesis that firms issue FRCs because 
their management is not comfortable with alternative ways to issue equity. 
 
The unconditional means of the two groups show that the average percent of insiders on the board of 
directors is 29.84 percent among non-FRC issuing firms.  (See Table 8.)  On the other hand, the 
average insider percentage is 40.33 percent among FRC issuers. The difference is statistically 
significant at the five percent level. This difference in groups suggests that the quality of board 
monitoring affects the decision to issue FRCs. This result also supports the belief that faulty contract 
design is an influential reason for firms to issue FRCs because if FRC issuance were to maximize the 
value of existing equity in the firm, then firms whose boards are more independent from 
management would permit the issuances of FRCs.  
 
Other variables do not display statistically significant differences between the two groups. Whether 
the CFO was previously a financial officer of a different public firm or a non-public firm does not 
make any difference between the FRC issuers and the control firms. Officer and director ownership 
of the firm is not different between the two groups. The percent of directors who are financial 
experts, i.e. those who are officers in a financial institution or are CFOs themselves, is not different 
between the two groups either.  
 
The data of one variable, MBA, is frequently less available than the others in the firms’ filings. 
Among the control group, 60.32 percent of firms’ CFOs did have MBAs, and among FRC issuers, 
44.44% had MBAs. However, this difference is not statistically significant. Because this field has 
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more missing values, the regressions in the next section use a dummy variable that equals one when 
the education of the CFO is unknown and zero otherwise, and the MBA variable equals one if the 
CFO is known to have an MBA and equal to zero if otherwise. 
 
Regression.  A multinomial regression is run on the managerial characteristics and the PIPE 
issuance propensity score.  The dependent variable takes four values:  0 if the firm is a matched non-
equity issuer, 1 if a FRC issuer, 2 if a fixed price PIPE issuer, and 3 if a SEO issuer.  The propensity 
score is included as a regressor as an additional control beyond the fact that the firms are already 
similarly matched.  The results of the regression are robust to excluding the propensity score.  I find 
that firms with CFOs with prior public equity experience are less likely to issue FRCs at the ten 
percent level.  The regression does not support the unconditional means finding that more board 
insiders are positively correlated with FRC issuance in the presence of other management variables.  
I do find that the ratio of CFO to CEO pay is positively correlated with PIPE issuance over SEO or 
no equity issuance at the five percent significance level.  This relationship may be saying that, all 
else equal, a firm where the CFO is more on par with the CEO in influence is more likely to issue 
PIPEs.   
Table 8 
Issuance Choice:  Multinomial Logit Regression 
A multinomial regression model is presented.   The left hand side takes four possible:  FRC issuer, fixed price PIPE issuer, 
SEO issuer, and match non-equity issuer.  The non-issuer is the excluded class.  The coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses are given below.  Statistical significance at varying levels is denoted with a * (10%), ** (5%), and *** (1%). 
 
 Issuer Type 
Variable 
FRC Issuer 
Fixed Price PIPE 
Issuer SEO Issuer 










































































































    
Number of Observations 112   
Pseudo  R-squared 0.419   
 
 
B.  Stock Market Reaction to FRC Announcement by Managerial Characteristics 
 The variation in the stock market reactions to FRC issuances is explained partly by management 
characteristics. Four separate regressions are run, one for each group of firms.  See Table 9.  Among 
FRC issuers, the only characteristic at the five percent level of significance in CARs around the 
announcement is the ratio of CFO compensation to CEO compensation.  The relationship between 
abnormal returns and this variable is negative, suggesting that the market reacts negatively to FRC 
issuers by firms in which the CFO has more clout relative to the CEO.   
 
The only other variable displaying significance in the FRC announcement reaction regression is the 
unknown education dummy variable, having a positive sign.  The interpretation for this result is 
unclear.  Unavailable educational data may be a proxy for either less reporting quality, which would 
not support the argument that managerial quality impacts firm value.  Alternatively, citing 
educational background may be a substitute for citing experience, in which case the significantly 
positive sign on unknown education would support the argument that managerial quality does 
impact firm value. 
 
Number of board insiders appears as a significant variable in the SEO and Non-Issuer regressions, 
but not the FRC issuer regression.  This may indicate that corporate governance is a concern when 
SEOs are issued or no issuance is made by firms similar to the issuing firms. 
 
Apart from the CFO to CEO compensation ratio, I do not see market reaction being sensitive to 
managerial characteristics in a clearly interpretable way.  The market may be concerned in 
particular by a FRC issuance announcement when the CFO is more highly compensated.  This 
relationship supports the FCD hypothesis where the CFO has less oversight because she holds a 
higher rank in the firm. 
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Table 9 
Regressions:  11 day CAR on Management Characteristics by Firm Type 
Each column represents a separate regression of the CAR [-5,+5] around issuance announcements (or imputed 
announcements) on the managerial variables.  Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated five days prior through five days 
after the issuance announcement (imputed announcement in the case of the matched non-equity-issuers).  The abnormal 
return is computed by using a four factor market model:  the excess market, small minus big portfolio, high minus low market 
to book portfolio, and the winners minus losers momentum portfolio.  The coefficients on each of these are calculated over the 
250 market day period a month prior to the events for each firm.  The managerial values are collected in the period prior to 
the security issuances, or imputed issuances in the case of the matched non-equity-issuers.  CFO / CEO Comp is the fraction 
of CFO cash compensation to CEO cash compensation.  % Board Insiders is the percent of board members who are also 
managers of the same firms.  % Board Financial Experts is the percent of board members who are either employed by a 
financial institution or is a CFO.  The coefficients with standard errors in parentheses are given below.  Statistical 
significance at varying levels is denoted with a * (10%), ** (5%), and *** (1%).  FRC issuers’ variables’ means are significantly 
different from the fixed price PIPE issuers, SEO issuers, non-equity-issuers if denoted by an a, b, or c, respectively, at the 5% 
level. 
 
Variable FRC Issuer 
Fixed Price 
PIPE Issuer SEO Issuer Non-Issuers 
CFO with Prior Public Firm Experience -0.048 0.027 0.0839487 -0.1047058 
0.105 0.416 0.0526844 0.0829212 
CFO with Public Equity Offering 
Experience 
 
0.019 -0.066 -0.1092252 -0.0378850 
0.156 0.408 0.1125912 0.0892258 
Total Director and Management 
Ownership 
 
0.005 -4.69E-4 0.0079937 -0.0040279 
0.003 0.009 0.0041605 0.0031122 
CFO/CEO Comp 
 
-0.396**c -0.611 -0.0588477 0.0409362 
0.179 0.857 0.1246221 0.1454364 
% Board Insiders 
 
-0.104 c 0.100 -0.3762595** -0.7817884** 
0.146 0.975 0.1701241 0.2892039 
% Board Financial Experts 
 
0.271 0.120 -0.0543524 -0.0922416 
0.221 0.848 0.1641585 0.2475943 
Avg. Board Age 
 
0.014 0.001 -0.0050111 -0.0143507** 
0.016 0.028 0.0053303 0.0068937 
CFO with MBA 
 
-0.008 -0.194 0.0768565 0.1083244 
0.132 0.353 0.0938519 0.1307238 
CFO with Unknown Education 0.364** ac -0.256 0.011357 0.1142139 
0.139 0.273 0.1030467 0.1187252 
CFO Ownership 
 
-0.090 -0.106 0.3157607 0.0272749 
0.057 0.290 0.2763186 0.0456118 
CEO Ownership 0.005 -0.001 -0.0056735 0.0154634** 
0.005 0.015 0.0045315 0.0064923 
CFO Compensation 3.44E-7 2.53E-7 -1.18E-7 1.73E-7 
3.79E-7 1.80E-7 1.19E-7 1.46E-7 
Propensity to Issue PIPE  2.159 4.299 1.204** 2.255** 
2.162 3.540 0.580 0.919 
Intercept -0.926 c -0.283 0.074 0.719 
0.999 1.628 0.354 0.473 
 
 
C. Long-Run Stock Performance  
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Four portfolios are created of firms that either issued each for each group of firms.  The monthly 
return of these firms is regressed on the Fama French plus momentum factors over 2001-2003.  Each 
group’s monthly portfolio is composed of firms who issue (or are imputed with an issue) in the twelve 
months prior to the particular month.  The non-issuers have an issuance date imputed to them 
according to the issuance dates of the FRCs to which the non-issuer have the closest propensity 
scores.  The significances of the estimates of alpha are evaluated by the mean return of 1,000 
regressions using random samples of firms in the same size and book-to-market deciles as the FRC 
issuers (Mitchell and Stafford, 2001).  The portfolio returns of firm group p in month t are regressed 
on a constant, the Fama French factors, and the momentum portfolio: 
 
tpUMDUMDpMKTMKTpHMLHMLpSMBSMBpMKTMKTpptp rrrrrr ,,,,,,, εβββββα ++++++=  
 
Table 10 
Calendar Time Portfolio Alphas 
Each row corresponds to a separate regression that predicts the return of the row’s portfolio description.  The monthly returns 
are regressed on the Fama French plus momentum factors over 2001-2003.  Each group’s monthly portfolio is composed of 
firms who issue (or are imputed with an issue) in the twelve months prior to the particular month.  The non-issuers have an 
issuance date imputed to them according to the issuance dates of the FRCs to which the non-issuer have the closest 
propensity scores.  The significances of the estimates of alpha are evaluated by the mean return of 1,000 regressions using 
random samples of firms in the same size and book-to-market deciles as the FRC issuers (Mitchell and Stafford, 2001). 
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The regression of all FRC issuers shows a negative monthly alpha of -2.48 percent, which is 
economically a large amount, but weak statistically at only the ten percent level.  The weaker 
significance contrasts with Hillion and Vermaelen (2004)’s stronger statistical finding of negative 
future abnormal returns.  Two differences between this study and theirs are the sample periods and 
the methodologies.  First, Hillion and Veramaelen (2004) use FRCs issued during the 1990s, and I 
use FRCs issued over 2001-2002.  As the market had more experience with FRCs, the firms may 
have become more careful with the terms to which they agreed, thus reducing the likelihood that 
their stocks would enter “death spirals.”  Second, Hillion and Vermaelen (2004) use buy and hold 
abnormal returns instead of computing calendar time alphas.  This difference may be symptomatic of 
the problems with the buy and hold return approach cited by Barber and Lyon (1997, 1999). 
 
A portfolio with a long position in FRC issuers with CFOs who have prior experience issuing stock 
publically and a short position in FRC issuers without CFOs with this experience show a more 
significant statistical result.  This “experienced minus inexperienced” FRC portfolio has a positive 
monthly alpha of 9.79 percent at the five percent level of significance (Mitchell and Stafford t-
statistic of 2.53).  This striking difference among FRC issuing firms provides support to the FCD 
hypothesis.  The significantly greater returns FRC issuers with experienced CFOs does not indicate 
these firms are struggling as the FLR hypothesis predicts.  Rather, the non-negative returns to these 
firms support the OSD hypothesis, that the FRC terms are appropriate for the firm and are optimal 
for existing shareholders. 
 
The same analysis performed on the three groups of control firms provides robust support to the 
above findings.  The portfolios long in FRC issues and short in either the fixed PIPE or SEO issuers 
both show insignificant alphas, which does not support the FCD and FLR hypotheses, and does 
support the OSD hypothesis.  The portfolio long in FRC issuers and short in matched non-issuers, 
however, does show a negative alpha close to the five percent significance level, which does not 
support the FLR hypothesis because the firms that do not obtain additional equity financing perform 
better overall. 
 
Portfolios long in experienced and short in inexperienced CFOs per control group display no 
significant alphas.  Therefore, the significant alpha of the FRC experienced minus inexperienced 
portfolio is all the more compelling. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
This research adds to the body of knowledge on the motives for FRC issues by characterizing the 
types of issuers at the managerial level.  FRC issuing firms that have CFOs without prior experience 
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in making a public offering of equity have significantly poorer stock returns than FRC issuing firms 
with CFOs who have prior experience making public offerings.  The difference in stock returns 
suggests that the experience of the CFO indicates which FRC deals will not maximize shareholder 
value.  While some firms may be taken advantage of when issuing FRCs, the FRC contract may be a 
rational security that is appropriate for some firms by resolving the problems posed by classical 
corporate finance such as the trade-off between the debt tax shield and bankruptcy costs and the 
overhang of debt on investment decisions. 
 
I also find an interesting relationship between CFO compensation relative to the CEO and both the 
decision to issue a FRC and the market’s reaction to issuance announcements.  Firms with higher 
CFO to CEO compensation ratios are more likely to issue FRCs.   Among FRC issue announcements, 
the market reacts negatively when CFOs are more highly compensated.  This finding merits further 
study on the relationship between CEO and CFO with regard to financing decisions. 
 
The OSD hypothesis is introduced to explain FRCs.  Further research could formalize it and allow 






FRC Issuers with CFOs with prior public issue experience 
 
COMPUTER MOTION INC – GORDON L. ROGERS 
 
GORDON L. ROGERS joined the Company as Vice President / Chief Financial Officer in March 
2000. From 1999 to 2000, Mr. Rogers served as Vice President of Finance at ViroLogic, Inc. a medical 
biotechnology company. Previously, he spent five years at Nellcor Puritan Bennett, Inc., one of the 
world's largest medical device manufacturers, most recently as Controller for Worldwide Field 
Operations. 
 
CRAY INC – KENNETH L. JOHNSON 
Kenneth W. Johnson serves as Vice President - Legal, General Counsel and Secretary and has held 
those positions since joining us in September 1997. From September 1997 to December 2001 he also 
served as our Vice President – Finance and Chief Financial Officer. Prior to joining us, Mr. Johnson 
practiced law in Seattle for twenty years with Stoel Rives LLP and predecessor firms, where his 
practice emphasized corporate finance. Mr. Johnson received an A.B. degree from Stanford 
University and a J.D. degree from Columbia University Law School. 
EXELIXIS – JOHN Y. S.ATO 
Glen Y. Sato has served as the Company's Chief Financial Officer, Vice President of Legal Affairs 
and Secretary since November 1999. From April 1999 to November 1999, Mr. Sato served as Vice 
President, Legal and General Counsel for Protein Design Labs, Inc., a biotechnology company, where 
he previously served as the Associate General Counsel and Director of Corporate Planning from July 
1993 to April 1999. Mr. Sato holds a B.A. from Wesleyan University and a J.D. and M.B.A. from the 
University of California, Los Angeles. 
KEY3MEDIA GROUP INC – PETER B. KNEPPER 
Peter B. Knepper was hired by Ziff-Davis in March 2000 to be our Executive Vice President and 
Chief Financial Officer. From 1998 to March 2000, he was a private investor and consultant 
providing strategic planning and financial management services. Mr. Knepper was previously Senior 
Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Ticketmaster Group, Inc., a position he held for more 
than ten years, from 1988 to 1998. 
NEKTAR THERAPEUTICS – BRIGID A. MAKES 
Brigid A. Makes has served as Vice President of Finance and Administration and Chief Financial 
Officer since June 1999. Ms. Makes has also served as Assistant Secretary since January 2001. From 
1998 until joining Inhale, Ms. Makes served as Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer 
for Oravax, Inc., a life sciences company. From 1992 to 1998, Ms. Makes served in various 
management positions for Haemonetics Corporation, a developer of automated blood processing 
systems, including, from 1995 to 1998, Vice President Finance, Chief Financial Officer and 
Treasurer. Prior to Haemonetics Corporation, Ms. Makes held a number of financial management 
positions at Lotus Development Corp. (now International Business Machines) and General Electric 
Co. Ms. Makes holds a Bachelor of Commerce degree from McGill University in Finance and 
International Business and an MBA from Bentley College.  
RENTECH INC – JAMES P. SAMUELS 
Mr. James P. Samuels, age 55, has served as Vice President-Finance, Treasurer and Chief Financial 
Officer of Rentech since May 1, 1996. He has executive experience in general corporate management, 
finance, sales and marketing, information technologies, and consulting for both large companies and 
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development stage businesses. From December 1995 through April 1998, he provided consulting 
services in finance and securities law compliance to Telepad Corporation, Herndon, Virginia, a 
company engaged in systems solutions for field force computing. From 1991 through August 1995, 
Mr. Samuels served as chief financial officer, vice president-finance, treasurer and director of Top 
Source, Inc., Palm Beach Gardens, Florida, a development stage company engaged in developing and 
commercializing state-of-the-art technologies for the transportation, industrial and petrochemical 
markets. During that employment, he also served during 1994 and 1995 as president of a subsidiary 
of Top Source, Inc. From 1989 to 1991, he was vice president and general manager of the Automotive 
group of BML Corporation, Mississauga, Ontario, a privately-held company engaged in auto rentals, 
car leasing, and automotive insurance. From 1983 through 1989, Mr. Samuels was employed by 
Purolator Products Corporation, a large manufacturer and distributor of automotive parts. He was 
president of the Mississauga, Ontario branch from 1985 to 1989; a director of marketing from 1984 
to 1985; and director of business development and planning during 1983 for the Rahway, New Jersey 
filter division headquarters of Purolator Products Corporation. From 1975 to 1983, he was employed 
by Bendix Automotive Group, Southfield, Michigan, a manufacturer of automotive filters, electronics 
and brakes. He served in various capacities, including group director for management consulting 
services on the corporate staff, director of market research and planning, manager of financial 
analysis and planning, and plant controller at its Fram Autolite division. From 1973 to 1974, he was 
employed by Bowmar Ali, Inc., Acton, Massachusetts, in various marketing and financial positions, 
and in 1974 he was managing director of its division in Wiesbaden, Germany. He received a 
Bachelor’s degree in Business Administration from Lowell Technological Institute in 1970, and a 
Master of Business Administration degree in 1972 from Suffolk University, Boston, Massachusetts. 
He completed an executive program in strategic market management through Harvard University in 
Switzerland in 1984.  
 
STAR TELECOMMUNICATIONS INC – KELLY D. ENOS 
KELLY D. ENOS has served as our Chief Financial Officer since December 1996 and as Treasurer 
and Assistant Secretary since April 1997. Prior to that time, Ms. Enos was an independent 
consultant in the merchant banking field from February 1996 to November 1996 and a Vice 
President of Fortune Financial, a merchant banking firm, from April 1995 to January 1996. Ms. 
Enos served as a Vice President of Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., an investment bank, from July 1994 to 
March 1995 and a Vice President of Sutro & Co., an investment bank, from January 1991 to June 
1994. 
TARGETTED GENETICS CORP – TODD E. SIMPSON 
Todd E. Simpson has served as vice president, finance and administration, chief financial officer, 
treasurer and secretary of Targeted Genetics since October 2001. From January 1996 to October 
2001, Mr. Simpson served as vice president, finance and administration and chief financial officer of 
Aastrom Biosciences, Inc., a public life science company focused on the development of cell-based 
therapeutics. From August 1995 to December 1995, he served as treasurer of Integra LifeSciences 
Corporation, a public biotechnology company, which acquired Telios Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in August 
1995. From 1992 until its acquisition by Integra, he served as vice president of finance and chief 
financial officer of Telios and in various other finance-related positions. From 1983 to 1992, Mr. 
Simpson practiced public accounting with the firm of Ernst & Young LLP. Mr. Simpson is a certified 
public accountant. He received his B.S. in accounting and computer science from Oregon State 
University. 
TIVO INC – DAVID COURTNEY 
David Courtney was appointed by our Board to serve as a director in May 2002. Mr. Courtney joined 
TiVo in March 1999 as Vice President and Chief Financial Officer and in March 2000 was named 
Senior Vice President for Finance and Administration. Mr. Courtney is currently Chief Financial 
Officer and Executive Vice President, Worldwide Operations and Administration, serving in this 
capacity since October 2001. From May 1995 to July 1998, Mr. Courtney served as a Managing 
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Director at J.P. Morgan, an investment banking firm, where he was responsible for building and 
expanding the firm’s high technology investment banking business in the United States. From 1986 
to 1995, Mr. Courtney was a member of the high technology investment banking group at Goldman, 
Sachs & Co., most recently serving as Vice President. Mr. Courtney currently serves as a director of 
KQED Television, a non-profit affiliate of the Public Broadcasting System in San Francisco, 
California. Mr. Courtney holds a B.A. degree in Economics from Dartmouth College and an M.B.A. 
degree from Stanford University.  
VIASOURCE COMMUNICATIONS INC. DOUGLAS J. BETLACH 
DOUGLAS J. BETLACH has been our Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer 
and Secretary since June 1999. Prior to joining Viasource, Mr. Betlach was Vice President, Chief 
Financial Officer and Treasurer of Dycom Industries, Inc., a nationwide provider of engineering, 
construction and maintenance services to telecommunications operators. 
V-ONE CORP – MARGARET E. GRAYSON 
MARGARET E. GRAYSON (54) was elected President and CEO in November 2000. She had served 
as the Company's Senior Vice President and Chief Financial  Officer since May 1999.  Ms.  Grayson 
was elected to the Board of  Directors  in August  1999. Prior to joining V-ONE  Corporation,  Ms.  
Grayson  served as Vice  President of Finance  and  Administration  and Chief  Financial  Officer for  
SPACEHAB,  Inc. (Nasdaq: SPAB) from September 1994 to October 1998. Immediately prior to 
joining SPAB,  Ms.  Grayson  served as Chief  Financial  Officer  for CD Radio,  Inc. in Washington,  
D.C., an early entrant in the satellite radio mobile communications market.  Previously,  Ms. 
Grayson served as a senior executive and consultant to high technology start-up companies.  Ms. 
Grayson is on the Board of Directors of Ronbotics Corporation and the Advisory Board of Celsion 
Corporation. Ms. Grayson holds an M.B.A.  from the  University  of South Florida and a B.S. in 
Accounting from the State University of New York at Buffalo. 
FRC Issuers with CFOs without public issue experience 
ADEPT TECHNOLOGY – MICHAEL W. OVERBY 
Michael W. Overby has served as Adept's Vice President of Finance and Chief Financial Officer since 
March  2000. From December 1999 to March 2000, Mr. Overby held the position of Corporate 
Controller at Adept. Prior to joining Adept, Mr. Overby was the financial executive for DG Systems, 
a leading provider of digital distribution services to the broadcast  advertising industry.  From 1996 
to 1998 he was  Corporate  Controller  and  Director of  Information  Systems at Inprise Corporation,  
formerly Borland,  a public software  company.  Mr. Overby holds a B.S. in Business Administration 
from California Polytechnic State University. 
 
ALKERMES INC. – JAMES M. FRATES   
 Mr. Frates has been Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of Alkermes since July 
1998. From June 1996 to July 1998, he was employed at Robertson, Stephens & Company, most 
recently as a Vice President in Investment Banking. Prior to that time he was employed at 
Robertson, Stephens & Company and at Morgan Stanley & Co. In June 1996, he obtained his M.B.A. 
from Harvard University. 
 
ALLIANCE PHARMACEUTICALS – TIM T. HART 
TIM T. HART, C.P.A. Mr. Hart, who is 44, was appointed Vice President in May 1999 and Chief 
Financial Officer in August 1998. He joined the Company in 1991 as Controller and has also served 
as Treasurer since 1994. Prior to joining Alliance in 1991, he was employed in various financial 
management positions at Cubic Corporation for over eight years. He was also employed by Ernst & 
Whinney in San Diego, California as a C.P.A. 
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ANTEX BIOLOGICS – GREGORY C. ZAKARIAN 
 GREGORY C. ZAKARIAN, CPA, age 52, has served as Vice President, Finance and Administration, 
Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of the Company since September 1992. He has served as 
Secretary of the Company since November 1993, and as Assistant Secretary of the Company from 
September 1992 until October 1993. Prior to September 1992, Mr. Zakarian was a partner with an 
international CPA firm.  
 
APPIANT TECHNOLOGIES – DOUGLAS S. ZORN 
DOUGLAS S. ZORN. Mr. Zorn has been our Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive Officer and 
President since May 2000. Mr. Zorn served as Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, 
Secretary and a Director of the Company since our incorporation in October 1996 until May 2000. 
Mr. Zorn served as Executive Vice President, Secretary and Treasurer, and Chief Financial and 
Operating Officer of BioFactors, Inc. from December 1993 until February 1997 and as a Director 
from June 1994 until February 1997. 
CECO ENVIRONMENTAL CORP – MARSHALL J. MORRIS 
Marshall J. Morris became the Chief Financial Officer of the Company on January 26, 2000. From 
1996 to 1999 Mr. Morris was Treasurer of Calgon Carbon Corporation which stock trades on the New 
York Stock Exchange and which is a worldwide producer of specialty chemicals and supplier of 
pollution control technologies and services with annual sales of approximately $300 million. From 
1995 to 1996 he served as a consultant with respect to business management and strategic planning. 
From 1989 through 1995 Mr. Morris also served as the Treasurer of Trico Products Corporation, an 
international manufacturer and distributor of original equipment automative parts with annual 
sales of approximately $350 million. 
CEL-SCI CORP – GEERT KERSTEN 
Geert R. Kersten, Esq. Mr. Kersten was Director of Corporate and Investment Relations for the 
Company between February 1987 and October 1987. In October of 1987, he was appointed Vice 
President of Operations.  In December 1988, Mr. Kersten was appointed Director of the  Company.  
Mr. Kersten also became the Company's Treasurer in 1989.  In May 1992, Mr. Kersten was 
appointed Chief Operating Officer and in February 1995, Mr. Kersten became the Company's Chief 
Executive Officer.  In previous years, Mr. Kersten worked as a financial analyst with Source Capital, 
Ltd., an investment advising firm in McLean, Virginia. Mr. Kersten is a stepson of Maximilian de 
Clara, who is the President and a Director of the Company. Mr. Kersten attended George 
Washington University in Washington, D.C.  where he earned a B.A.  in Accounting  and an  M.B.A. 
with emphasis  on International  Finance.  He also attended law school at American University in 
Washington, D.C. where he received a Juris Doctor degree. 
CHAMPION ENTERPRISES – ANTHONY C. CLEBURG 
In 2000 Mr. Cleberg joined Champion from Washington Group International (“Washington Group”), 
a publicly-held engineering and construction firm, where for the previous three years he was the 
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer. On May 14, 2001, subsequent to Mr. Cleberg’s 
departure from Washington Group, it filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. On January 25, 2002, Washington Group completed its Plan of 
Reorganization and emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Previous to Washington Group, 
Mr. Cleberg worked for Honeywell Inc. for 15 years in various senior financial positions, leaving as 
Corporate Vice President, Business Development.  
CHELL GROUP – DON PAGNUTTI 
Don Pagnutti was appointed our Vice President, Finance on September 19, 2000. Mr. Pagnutti has 
been our Chief Financial Officer since September 1998, and was our Executive Vice President and 
Chief Operating Officer from September 1997 to September 2000. From 1996 to 1997, he worked for 
Sullivan Entertainment Inc., as Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer. From 1980 to 
94
1996, he worked for Telemedia Communications Ltd., a large Canadian media company as Vice 
President, Radio. Mr. Pagnutti is a Chartered Accountant and has a Masters Degree in Business 
Administration and a Bachelor of Commerce Degree from the University of Toronto. 
CLEAN HARBORS INC - ROGER A. KOENECKE 
Roger A. Koenecke joined the Company as Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer in 1998. 
From 1982 through 1997, Mr. Koenecke held a variety of management positions, including Senior 
Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, with Millbrook Distribution Services, Inc. and its 
predecessor corporations, which are engaged in the distribution of health and beauty care, general 
merchandise, and specialty food products. Prior to that, he was an Audit Manager with Price 
Waterhouse & Co., an international accounting firm. Mr. Koenecke holds a BS in Chemistry and 
MBA from the University of Wisconsin.  
 
CYBERCARE – PAUL PERSHES 
PAUL C. PERSHES (age 57) Class II, has served as a director since August 1996 and as our 
president since May 1997. In March 2001, Mr. Pershes assumed responsibilities as acting chief 
financial officer. Before joining us, Mr. Pershes founded and served as an officer of Weinberg, 
Pershes & Company, P.A., an accounting firm, from July 1994 to May 1997. Before founding 
Weinberg, Pershes & Company, Mr. Pershes was a senior partner of the international accounting 
firm Laventhol and Horvath for 18 years. 
 
DALEEN TECHNOLOGIES – STEVEN M. WAGMAN 
STEPHEN M. WAGMAN, 40, has served as chief financial officer of Daleen since June 2000 and has 
served as an executive vice president of corporate development and secretary since June 1999. Mr. 
Wagman has over 12 years of finance, business and legal experience with high-growth software 
companies.  Before joining Daleen, Mr. Wagman served in various capacities with PowerCerv 
Corporation, an enterprise resource planning software company, including Chief financial officer, 
treasurer, senior vice president of administration, general counsel and secretary. 
 
DATATEC SYSTEMS INC – ISAAC J. GAON 
Isaac J. Gaon,  Chairman of the Board since  December  1997 and  Director  since 1992, has served 
as the Chief Executive Officer since October 1994. He served as Chief Financial  Officer from April 
1992 until October 1994. From September 1987 to December  1991,  Mr. Gaon, a chartered  
accountant,  served as President  and Chief Executive  Officer of Toronto-based  NRG, Inc., (a 
subsidiary of Gestetner International)  an office equipment  supplier,  and in several senior 
management roles within Gestetner Canada and Gestetner USA. 
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DIGITAL RECORDERS – LAWRENCE A. TAYLOR 
Lawrence A. Taylor, age 55, has 12 years' experience in the transit industry, as well as extensive 
knowledge and experience in auditing, merger and acquisition reporting, analysis and financial 
information-technology systems. He has been the Company's secretary, chief financial officer and 
vice president since May 1998. From March 1997 to June 1999, Mr. Taylor was a partner in the 
Dallas office of Tatum CFO, LLP, a professional partnership of career CFOs. From March 1995 to 
August 1996, he was senior vice president of Precept Business Products, Inc., a privately held 
holding company in Dallas that distributed business forms, construction and on-demand courier 
services. From May 1991 to December 1994, he was vice president and group controller of Dallas-
based Mark IV Industries' Transportation Products Group, which included nine companies, 
subsidiaries and operating units serving transit and transportation markets worldwide. Prior to 
1991, he served in various financial managerial capacities in the food processing, commercial 
construction and oil field supply industries, as well as other manufacturing environments. A 1970 
graduate of Wayne State University in Detroit, Mich., Mr. Taylor earned a B.S. degree in 
Accounting. A Certified Public Accountant, he is a member of the Texas Society of CPAs and its 
Dallas Chapter, the American Institute of CPAs, and Financial Executive International. 
DYNTECK INC – JAMES A LINESCH 
Since August 14, 2000, Mr. Linesch has served as the Chief Financial and Chief Accounting Officer, 
Executive Vice President and Secretary, and since February 1997 Director, of TekInsight.  
Previously, Mr. Linesch was the President, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of 
CompuMed, a  public computer company involved with computer assisted diagnosis of medical 
conditions, which he joined in April 1996 as Vice President and Chief Financial Officer.  Mr. Linesch 
served as a Vice President, Chief Financial Officer of the Company from August 1991 to April 1996.  
From May 1998 to August 1991, Mr. Linesch served as the Chief Financial Officer of Science 
Dynamics Corp., a corporation involved in the development of computer Software.  Mr. Linesch holds 
a CPA certification in the State of California, where he practiced with Price Waterhouse from 1981 
to 1984. 
 
ECHOSTAR COMMUNICATIONS CORP – MICHAEL R. MCDONNEL 
Mr. McDonnell joined EchoStar in August 2000 as Chief Financial Officer. Mr. McDonnell is 
responsible for all accounting and finance functions of the Company. Prior to joining EchoStar, Mr. 
McDonnell was a Partner with PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, serving on engagements for companies 
in the technology and information communications industries. 
 
ELECTRIC CITY CORP – JEFFERY R. MISTARZ 
Jeffrey R. Mistarz has been our chief financial officer since January 2000 and our treasurer since 
October 2000. From January 1994 until joining us, Mr. Mistarz served as chief financial officer for 
Nucon Corporation, a privately held manufacturer of material handling products and systems, 
responsible for all areas of finance and accounting, managing capital and shareholder relations. 
Prior to joining Nucon, Mr. Mistarz was with First Chicago Corporation (now Bank One Corporation) 
for 12 years where he held several positions in corporate lending, investment banking and credit 
strategy.  
ELECTROGLAS INC – THOMAS E. BRUNTON 
Thomas E. Brunton was appointed Vice President — Finance, Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer and 
Secretary of the Company in November 2000. Prior to joining the Company, Mr. Brunton was Chief 
Financial Officer of Centigram Communications from March 1998 to July 2000. He joined Centigram 
in March 1991 as Controller and also served as Treasurer. Prior to his service at Centigram, he had 
financial management responsibilities at 3Com, Sun Microsystems, and IBM/ Rolm. 
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EUROTECH LTD – JOHN W. DOWIE 
JON W. DOWIE, 54, IS OUR VICE PRESIDENT, TREASURER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL 
OFFICER under an employment agreement that expired February 6, 2001. He joined the Company 
in February 2000 after serving as Vice President, Finance, and CFO for Research Planning, Inc., 
from September 1997. Prior to that, he served as Controller for Automation Research Systems Ltd. 
from August 1992. He is a Certified Public Accountant and a Certified Government Financial 
Manager. He holds a B.S. in Accounting and an MBA from Murray State University, and is a Doctor 
of Business Administration candidate in Information Systems, Finance, and Marketing at 
Mississippi State University. 
GLOBAL TECHNOVATIONS – DAVID NATAN 
David Natan - was appointed a director of the Company on April 16, 1998 in order to fill a vacancy.  
Currently, Mr. Natan, a CPA, has been Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company 
since June 1995 and Secretary from August 1997. Mr. Natan previously served on the Company's 
Board from June 1995 to January 1997.  Mr. Natan brings nearly 20 years of management and 
analytical experience to his responsibilities.  Prior to joining the Company, from November 1992 
through June 1995, Mr. Natan was Chief Financial Officer of MBf USA, Inc., which is a Nasdaq 
listed subsidiary of MBf Holdings Berhad, a multi-national conglomerate. From August 1987 
through October 1992, Mr. Natan was Treasurer and Controller for Jewelmasters, Inc., an AMEX 
listed company. 
 
HORIZON MEDICAL PRODUCTS INC – JULIE F. LANCASTER 
 Julie F. Lancaster has served as the Vice President — Finance since January 2001. Ms. Lancaster 
joined the Company in 1994 as Assistant Controller and served in that capacity until 1996. From 
August 1996 through August 2000, Ms. Lancaster served as Controller of the Company. From 
August 2000 to January 2001, Ms. Lancaster served as Director of Financial Reporting and Planning 
for the Company. 
 
HYPERTENSION DIAGNOSTICS – JAMES S.  MURPHY 
James S. Murphy Mr. Murphy joined us as Vice President of Finance and Chief Financial Officer 
during May 1996. In March 2000, his title was changed to Senior Vice President, Finance and 
Administration and Chief Financial Officer. Mr. Murphy was Controller of Gaming Corporation of 
America from December 1992 through November 1995. From 1978 to 1988, he was a tax partner 
with Fox, McCue and Murphy, a certified public accounting firm located in Eden Prairie, Minnesota. 
From 1970 to 1978, Mr. Murphy was employed by Ernst & Ernst (currently named Ernst & 
Young LLP) with both audit (six years) and tax (two years) experience. Mr. Murphy is a member of 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants as well as the Minnesota Society of CPAs. He 
holds a Bachelor of Science degree from Saint John’s University in Collegeville, Minnesota 
(1966) and a Master of Business Administration degree (M.B.A.) from the University of Minnesota 
(1968).  
INTERNATIONAL FIBERCOM INC – GREGORY B. HILL 
Mr. Hill served as our Controller from September 1999 to March 2000 and became our Vice 
President-Finance in April 2000. From June 1998 until June 1999 he was employed by All Star 
Telecom, an infrastructure development subsidiary that we acquired in April 1999, where he served 
as chief financial officer and controller. From June to September 1999, he served as Regional 
Controller of our Infrastructure Development Group. Mr. Hill is a certified public accountant and 
served in the Technology Industry Group of Price Waterhouse providing audit, transaction support, 
and business advisory services to technology companies from January 1992 through June 1998. He 
received his bachelor of science in business administration from California State University 
Sacramento. 
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MEDWAVE INC – MARK T. BAKKO 
MARK T. BAKKO is the Chief Financial Officer of the Company. He has served in this position since 
February 1996. From 1984 to 1996, Mr. Bakko was with Deloitte & Touche LLP with his most recent 
position being a senior manager. Mr. Bakko has been a Certified Public Accountant since 1985 in the 
State of Minnesota. Mr. Bakko holds a Masters of Business Taxation and B.S.B.A. degree in 
Accounting from the University of Minnesota. 
ONE VOICE TECHNOGOLOGIES – RAHOUL SHARAN 
Rahoul Sharan holds a Bachelor of Commerce degree from the University of British Columbia and is 
a member of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of British Columbia. Mr. Sharan was employed 
by Coopers & Lybrand (now Pricewaterhouse Coopers) from 1984 to 1989. Since 1989, Mr. Sharan 
has been the President and a Director of KJN Management Ltd., a private company that provides a 
broad range of administrative, management and financial services to both private and public 
companies. Mr. Sharan has been a partner in S & P Group, a company that specializes in investment 
financing for venture capital projects and real estate development and construction, since 1988. Mr. 
Sharan was also a Treasurer and Director. 
 
ONSTREAM MEDIAN CORP – GAIL L. BABITT 
GAIL BABITT, CPA. Ms. Babitt joined VDC as Chief Financial Officer in November 2000. From 
1999 through October 2000 Ms. Babitt served as Vice President of Finance, North America and 
Corporate Controller for TeleComputing ASA. TeleComputing ASA is a leading application service 
provider. From 1997 to 1999 Ms. Babitt served as Manager-Transaction Services for Price 
Waterhouse Coopers LLP. During 1997 Ms. Babitt served as Director of Finance for ToppTelecom, 
Inc. Topp Telecom is a prepaid cellular company based in Miami. From 1994 to 1997 Ms. Babitt 
worked in the audit group with Price Waterhouse Coopers LLP (formerly Price Waterhouse LLP) 
and with Ernst & Young LLP from 1992 to 1994. Ms. Babitt has received a MBA from Boston 
University and a B.S. from Nova Southeastern University. 
 
P-COM INC – LEIGHTON J. STEPHENSON 
Mr. Stephenson has served as Vice President and Chief Financial Officer since September 2000. 
From 1993 to 2000 he served as Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer, and Secretary of Vallen 
Corporation, a Texas company engaged in manufacturing and distribution of industrial safety 
products and services. 
 
PENTON MEDIA INC. – JOSEPH A. NECASTRO 
Joseph G. NeCastro, 44, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of Penton since June 1998. Before 
joining Penton, Mr. NeCastro spent five years with Reader's Digest Association, Inc. Mr. NeCastro 
was Vice President, Finance for Reader's Digest USA from 1995 until 1998 and Corporate Controller 
in 1994 and 1995. 
 
RAMP CORP – GARY L. SMITH 
Mr.  Smith joined the Company as Executive  Vice  President  and Chief  Financial  Officer in 
December of 2000.  From 1995 to 2000, Mr. Smith was with Provident Group, a financial  advisory 
firm serving companies  operating in emerging market countries,  where he was a principal.  
Previously, Mr. Smith was an executive of American  Express  Bank,  the  international  banking 
arm of the financial services  conglomerate American Express Corporation (NYSE: AXP), where he 
held various senior financial positions, most recently as Senior Director and Commercial  Banking 
Head, London Branch. He holds a BSc degree in Economics from the Wharton  School and an MSc in 
Accounting  and Finance from the London School of Economics. 
 
SCIENCE DYNAMICS CORP – ROBERT O’CONNOR 
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Robert O'Connor came to SciDyn from PricewaterhouseCoopers, L.L.P in Philadelphia, PA, where he 
served as a manager of middle market advisory services. Mr. O'Connor brings with him a strong 
background in corporate finance, including prior positions as Corporate Controller and Chief 
Financial Officer at three technology companies. Mr. O'Connor received his MBA from Rutgers-
Graduate School of Management, BS from Kean University in Union, NJ, and he is a Certified 
Public Accountant. 
 
STARBASE CORP – DOUGLAS S. NORMAN 
Douglas S. Norman founded Starbase in September 1991. In February 2000, Mr. Norman was 
appointed to serve as our Chief Financial Officer. From September 1997 to February 2000, 
Mr. Norman served as our Chief Accounting Officer. In February 2002, Mr. Norman was elected 
Secretary. Mr. Norman has served as our Assistant Secretary since February 1997 and Director of 
Finance from June 1996 to February 2000. Douglas S. Norman is the son-in-law of William R. Stow 
III, a member of the Board or Directors. Mr. Norman holds a B.S. in Business Administration from 
California State University and an M.B.A. from Loyola Marymount. 
 
STORAGE COMPUTER CORP – PETER N. HOOD 
  Peter N. Hood, 60, has been the Company's Chief Financial Officer since May 16, 2000. Mr. Hood 
was previously owner and Chief Executive Officer of Phoenix Custom Molders, Inc., a custom 
manufacturer of plastic parts from 1993 to 2000. Phoenix Custom Molders, Inc. filed Chapter 11 
bankruptcy on September 4, 1996 in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Hampshire. 
The Chapter 11 bankruptcy was entitled "In re Phoenix Custom Molders, Inc." and docketed as Bk. 
96-12443-MWV. Phoenix Custom Molders, Inc. emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy on August 17, 
1997. He was also co-founder and Vice President of Phoenix Distributors, Inc., a business involved in 
consolidating independent distributors of industrial gas and welding supplies from 1985 to 1993. 
From 1965 to 1985, he was with the accounting firm of Ernst & Young, becoming a partner in 1976. 
He received his business degree from Northeastern University and is a certified public accountant. 
TEAM COMMUNICATIONS GROUP – JAY J. SHAPIRO 
   Jay J. Shapiro became our President, Chief Operating Officer and acting Chief Financial Officer on 
March 16, 2001.  Mr. Shapiro will assist us in overseeing our corporate, financial and fiduciary 
activities worldwide.  From 1993 to 2000, Mr. Shapiro, a certified public accountant, operated a 
private accounting and consulting practice specializing in servicing the television industry.  During 
such period, he served as a temporary corporate officer for several publicly traded entertainment 
companies.  Mr. Shapiro received his B.B.A. from the University of Wisconsin and a MBA (with 
Distinction) in Accounting and Finance from Arizona State University Graduate School of Business 
Administration. 
THINKPATH INC – KELLY HANKINSON 
Kelly Hankinson has served as our Chief Financial Officer since May 1999 and as a Director since 
June 2000. Ms. Hankinson served as our Controller from February 1994 to May 1999. Ms. 
Hankinson has a Masters Degree and a Bachelors Degree from York University. 
 
US PLASTIC LUMBER CORP – MICHAEL D. SCHMIDT 
MICHAEL SCHMIDT is Treasurer and Vice President of Finance. Mr. Schmidt joined us in 
December 1997. Mr. Schmidt has over 20 years of public and private accounting experience including 
ten years in the environmental      industry. Prior to joining us, Mr. Schmidt served as Chief 
Financial Officer of Republic Environmental Systems, Inc., a publicly traded company and a leading 
environmental service provider, headquartered in Blue Bell, Pennsylvania, a position he held for 
approximately ten years. Mr. Schmidt has a B.S. degree in Business Administration from Rowan 
University and is a Certified Public Accountant in the State of New Jersey. 
 
VELOCITY EXPRESS CORP – MARK E. TIES 
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Mark E. Ties. Mr. Ties joined the Company in April 2000 as its Vice President of Finance. Mr. Ties is 
also the Vice President of Finance for Velocity Express. Mr. Ties has more than 13 years of financial 
experience, of which eight years have been at the executive level in a number of companies in varied 
industries. Since 1998 and prior to joining the Company, Mr. Ties was a Manager and Senior 
Manager for Ernst & Young LLP in its entrepreneurial services and mergers and acquisitions 
departments. From 1994 to 1998 Mr. Ties was the Chief Financial Officer of Progressive Beauty 
Enterprises, Inc., a regional distribution company. Prior to 1994 Mr. Ties was the corporate 
controller of MEI Salons, Inc. and prior to that he was a senior auditor for Coopers & Libran LLP. 
Mr. Ties is a Certified Public Accountant. 
WAVERIDER COMMUNICATIONS INC. – T. SCOTT WORTHINGTON 
T. Scott  Worthington has been a Vice President and the Company's chief financial  officer  since  
January  1998.  From 1988 to 1996,  he worked at Dell Computer Corporation,  in Canada, where he 
held numerous positions including CFO of the  Canadian  subsidiary.  From  October  1996  to  
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